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NOTES
ENDING THE WIDOW PENALTY:
WHY ARE SURVIVING ALIEN SPOUSES OF

DECEASED CITIZENS BEING DEPORTED?
Jayme A. Feldheim*
Although our nation generally permits aliens to apply to become lawful
permanent residents of this country through their marriages to American
citizens, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) automatically
denies these applications when the citizen spouse dies within two years of
the marriage. Termed the "widow penalty, " certain federal courts have
rejected this policy as being both unreasonable and in opposition to the
plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1151, the statute which categorizes aliens as
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and thus grants them this opportunity.
This conflict between the Agency and the judiciary, in turn, has caused a
circuit split in the federal courts over the proper construction of the statute.
This Note argues that the courts that do not award deference to the
Agency's interpretation are correct, and that USCIS should reform its
policy to conform to their rulings. The statute unambiguously grants alien
spouses the ability to be and to remain immediate relatives of U.S. citizens,
despite the death of their citizen spouse before the couple's two-year
wedding anniversary.
INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Carla Arabella Freeman and Mrs. Osserritta Robinson were two
women from opposite sides of the world with no apparent connection. Mrs.
Freeman was a dual citizen of South Africa and Italy, while Mrs. Robinson
was a citizen and national of Jamaica. However, both women eventually
found themselves facing a potentially similar fate. Mrs. Freeman came to
the United States to work as an au pair when she met Mr. Robert Freeman,
a U.S. citizen, in a karaoke bar in Chicago. The two then wed in February
of 2001. Mrs. Robinson came to the United States a year later in January of
2002 under a nonimmigrant visitor's visa. She then met and wed Mr. Louis
Robinson, a U.S. citizen. Each woman's husband, hoping to adjust his
wife's status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), filed a Petition
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Aaron Saiger for his guidance, Amanda Sue Nichols for her inspiration, and Brian, my
parents, and my sisters, Stacy and Randi, for all of their support and encouragement.

1873

1874

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

for Immediate Relative (Form 1-130) attesting to the fact that his marriage
was legitimate. Mr. Freeman filed his petition with U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), while Mr. Robinson filed his with INS's
successor, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). While
waiting for these applications to be processed, both women were confronted
with tragic circumstances: Mr. Freeman was killed in a car accident when a
Pepsi truck jumped a median strip and pulverized his vehicle;' Mr.
Robinson died in the Staten Island Ferry crash in October of 2003.2 Each
man's death occurred before his first wedding anniversary.
Mrs. Freeman and Mrs. Robinson then encountered the same
predicament, a "bizarre quirk in immigration law known as the 'widow
penalty."' 3 USCIS automatically turned down their immediate relative
petitions because of their husbands' deaths. The basis of this decision was
a USCIS procedure that denies a pending petition for alien relative status if
the citizen spouse dies within two years of the marriage. The rationale of
this policy, according to USCIS, is that an individual like Mrs. Freeman or
Mrs. Robinson can no longer qualify as an immediate relative of an
American citizen because her husband's death stripped her of her spousal
status.
Acting under the relevant immigration statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 11 l5(b)(2)(A)(i), USCIS acknowledges that the definition of "immediate
relative" in the first sentence contains the word "spouse." However, USCIS
claims that the second sentence of the statute mandates that spousal status
for immigration benefits can be only obtained if the alien was "the spouse
of a citizen of the United States for at least [two] years at the time of the
citizen's death."' 4 Hence, there is a general maxim in immigration law that
"[t]he 1-130 petition dies with the Petitioner." 5 Once their immediate
relative petitions were denied, Mrs. Freeman and Mrs. Robinson were
ordered to leave the country or face deportation. These women were not
alone in their predicament; there are currently over 180 of these cases
6
across the country affecting women, mothers, and children.
Both women filed suits against U.S. immigration services, with Mrs.
Freeman's earlier case being the first federal court challenge to the widow

1. Blaine Harden, Widows Face U.S. Deportation,WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2004, at Al.
2. Kirk Semple, Losing a Partner,and a Foothold,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at A 15.

3. The Florida Masochist, http://thefloridamasochist.blogspot.com/2007/05/endingwidow-penalty.html (May 6, 2007, 07:25 EST).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
5. Posting of Michael Shane to Ask a Lawyer, http://immigration.lawyers.com/ask-alawyer/Does-The-I- 130-Petition-Die-When-The-Petitioner-DiesU-7045.html
(Feb.
18,
2008).
6. Surviving Spouses Against Deportation, http://www.ssad.org/home.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2009). Males are also affected by this policy, and therefore this Note remains
gender neutral. However, "[s]pouse-based immigration has been and continues to be
predominately female." Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws:
Coverture's Diminishment, but Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 153, 154 (2004).
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penalty since the Immigration Act of 1990.7 Although their factual
dilemmas were nearly identical, their legal battles resulted in contradictory
outcomes. Mrs. Freeman's case was ultimately reviewed in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In 2006, this court ruled against USCIS
and held that an alien widow whose citizen spouse filed the necessary
immediate relative petition form but died within two years of the qualifying8
marriage nonetheless remains a spouse for immigration functions.
However, Mrs. Robinson's case came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Robinson v. Napolitano,9 and in 2009 that court decided
in favor of USCIS, holding that, because Mrs. Robinson's citizen spouse
died before the couple was married for two years, she could not qualify as
an "immediate relative" under the statute. 10 As the very recent ruling in
Robinson demonstrates, this dispute is not only alive but highly contentious;
any clear trend of the courts to rule against the agency was eradicated in
that decision.
Thus, two women in the same position before they encountered the
American legal system ended up in very different situations, solely due to
which court was ultimately reviewing their case. In essence, one woman
had the ability to become an LPR and therefore stay in this country, while
the other was faced with deportation. These two circuits are not the only
courts to weigh in on this issue; the Freeman v. Gonzales" decision was the
first in a line of cases constituting a circuit split as to the correct definition
of "spouse" for the purpose of an immediate relative petition. 12 U.S.
citizens may petition for an unlimited number of immediate relatives each
year, 13 and this fact "makes this important status highly appealing and thus
consequence to the
frequently controverted. This status has an important
4
interests of both immigrants and the government."'
The subject of this Note is a single statutory section of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA): the current conflict of authority with respect to
the definition of "spouse" and "immediate relative" status under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i). As stated above, USCIS claims that this statute permits
7. Surviving Spouses Against Deportation, Litigation to End the Widow Penalty,
http://www.ssad.org/litigation.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009); see infra notes 81-84. The
earliest challenge took place in 1968 in Pierno v. INS, 397 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1968).
8. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006).
9. No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009).
10. Id. at *22.
11. 444 F.3d 1031.

12. See infra note 16.
13.

AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS:

A

GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:1.1, at 3 (4th ed. 2008) ("[T]he most favored category of

family members under the INA is that of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.").
14. Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182 (D. Mass. 2007), appeal docketed, No.
08-1179 (1st Cir. Feb. 11, 2008). "There are few issues which cut as deeply into the
emotions of Americans as immigration. That is why comprehensive, fundamental reform of
immigration policy occurs infrequently. Vast revisions of immigration policy must await the
development of a wide consensus before Congress will agree to their enactment." Lawrence
H. Fuchs, Directionsfor U.S. Immigration Policy: Immigration Policy and the Rule of Law,

44 U. PITT. L. REV 433, 433 (1983).
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it to deny a Form 1-130 petition filed on behalf of an alien spouse if the
citizen spouse dies before the petition is adjudicated and within two years
of the couple's marriage. The basic notion underlying this position is that
once a citizen spouse is deceased, the alien's spousal status is dissolved.
The Robinson court and other federal district courts have accepted USCIS's
construction of the statute. However, the Freeman court as well as other
federal district courts have squarely rejected this interpretation and held
instead that § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) requires USCIS to treat an alien spouse as an
"immediate relative" for purposes of adjudicating a Form 1-130 petition,
15
even if their citizen spouse has died within two years of the marriage.
Thus, beyond a clear clash between the interpretations of a government
agency and the judiciary, this issue has also precipitated a circuit split.
Beyond Freeman and Robinson, four other district courts have ruled on this
issue, aligning themselves with either the Ninth Circuit or with USCIS and
the Third Circuit. 16 As of the date of publication of this Note, there are
approximately twelve more cases currently pending.1 7 U.S. district courts
in the First and Sixth Circuits have expressly adopted the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation. 18 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has followed the reasoning
of Freeman to rule analogously in the context of divorce. 19 However,
beyond Robinson, two district courts in the Second and Sixth Circuits have
followed the opposite approach urged by USCIS. 20 In essence, there are
the time of filing
two conflicting ways to interpret the statute: "[e]ither
21
controls or the time of the citizens death controls."

15. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1034.
16. Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *30 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 7, 2008), appeal docketed, No. 08-3321 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2008); Taing, 526 F.
Supp. 2d at 177; Turek v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 450 F. Supp. 2d 736 (E.D. Mich. 2006);
Burger v. McElroy, No. 97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,
1999).
17. Semple, supra note 2; see, e.g., Gorovets v. Chertoff, No. 08-CV-10094 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Nov. 20, 2008); Kells v. Chertoff, No. 08-CV-1582 (E.D. Mo. filed Oct. 14, 2008);
Hanford v. Chertoff, No. SA-08-CA-0795XR (W.D. Tex. filed Sept. 25, 2008).
18. See Lockhart, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *30 ("As the well-reasoned opinion[]
of the Ninth Circuit (Freeman) ...conclude[d], the plain language of the statute simply does
not impose a two year requirement on 'immediate relative' status for a surviving alienspouse."); Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 187 ("This Court agrees with the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of [§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)]. Mrs. Taing remains an immediate relative and ought
therefore to have her Applications adjudicated as such.").
19. See Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) ("As in Freeman, we
here similarly find nothing.., suggesting that an application that was valid when submitted
should be automatically invalid when the petitioner's marriage ends by divorce two years
later.").
20. See Turek, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (finding persuasive that "the BIA had previously
determined that the beneficiary of a spousal immediate relative petition would be ineligible
for that status if the petitioning spouse dies before the statutory two-year time period");
Burger, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *19 (finding that the death of the citizen spouse
after three months of marriage meant that the alien wife and daughter were not eligible for
classification as immediate relatives under the statutory provision).
21. Robinson v. Chertoff, No. 06-5702, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34956, at *13 (D.N.J.
May 14, 2007).
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In Part I, this Note explains several facets of the immigration process
relating to Form 1-130 immediate relative petitions as well as the source of
USCIS's position in this controversy. Part I continues to explore the basic
scope of judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes such as
USCIS's construction of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), particularly administrative
deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.22 Part II examines the current conflict surrounding the
relevant statute through the lens of the various steps of Chevron deference.
Lastly, Part III concludes that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the
appropriate definition of "spouse" for purposes of a Form 1-130 petition.
This part argues that USICS should reform its policy to comport with the
holding of the Ninth Circuit in Freeman. Doing so would clarify this
statute and mandate that people in Mrs. Freeman's and Mrs. Robinson's
positions would no longer have to face the consequences of the widow
penalty.
I. THE WIDOW PENALTY IN PRACTICE
Part I introduces the process by which alien spouses of U.S. citizens can
acquire LPR status under the INA; specifically it discusses the 1-130
Petition for Alien Relative. This part also explores the statute at issue-8
U.S.C. § 1151-considering both its language and structure. Then, Part I
explains the theory underlying judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations, mainly discussing the notion of Chevron deference. Lastly,
this part examines the three main events that contributed to this judicialagency clash: (1) the agency decision that established USCIS's policy; (2)
the Freeman judgment at length as well as the other court decisions in the
circuit split including Robinson; and (3) the subsequent memorandum by
USCIS clarifying its current position.
A. The Immigration and NationalityAct and U.S. Citizenship and
ImmigrationServices
For those persons who are not born in the United States, Congress has
plenary power to determine who can be admitted into this country and who
may be expelled. 23 Congress has the ability to give aliens rights through
various statutes, and therefore a court's power is limited to interpretation of
that specific statute. 24 In 1952, Congress enacted the McCarran-Walter
Act, otherwise known as the INA. 25 The Act consolidated all previous

22. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
23. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIORATION LAW 19 (Stephanie L. Browning
ed., 2006). The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated this doctrine in Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
24. BOSWELL, supra note 23, at 20.

25. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
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immigration laws into one comprehensive statute. 26 The INA has been
amended many times, but continues to be the basic body of immigration
law today. 27 Since the INA was enacted, Congress has delegated broad
authority and discretion to "myriad government agencies" to enforce the
28
various immigration statutes.
The INS administered immigration law under the U.S. Department of
Justice beginning in 1940.29 However, in 2003, Congress moved certain
service and benefit functions of the INS into the newly created U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 30 Under the new legislation, the
NS was abolished and transformed into USCIS on March 1, 2003.31 The
duties of USCIS mainly consist of the "administration of immigration and
naturalization adjudication functions and establishing immigration services
policies and priorities. ' 32 One specific responsibility of USCIS-and the
focus of this Note-is to "adjudicate" or process Immigrant Visa Petitions
33
such as the Form 1-130, Petition for Alien Relative.
1. Petitions, Paperwork, and Processing: How Alien Spouses Become
American Citizens
a. Establishingthe Relationship: Form 1-130, Petitionfor Alien Relative
Under the INA, an alien 34 who is married to a U.S. citizen 35 may acquire
permanent residency (LPR status) as a result of his or her classification as
an immediate relative of their citizen spouse. 36 The Form 1-130 petition is a
26.

DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE: IN A

NUTSHELL 15 (5th ed. 2005).

27. Immigration and Nationality Act, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow
"Laws and Regulations" hyperlink; then follow "Immigration and Nationality Act"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
28. BOSWELL, supra note 23, at 1.
29. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 101
n.2 (3d ed. 1995).
30. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
31. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13, § 1:4, at 20. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) is one component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
along with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. Id. § 1:2, at 4. This Note uses "USCIS" as the designation for both the INS
prior to March 1, 2003, and the current USCIS within DHS.
32. See About USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ (follow "About USCIS"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
33. Id.
34. "Aliens" are defined as any persons not citizens or nationals of the United States. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006).
35. The term "citizen" is not defined within the INA. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13,
§ 1:5, at 26.
36. See Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 7, 2008) ("'Immediate relative' status is a prerequisite to eligibility for adjustment
of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)."). In fact, "[o]ne of the principal objectives of the [INA]
is family reunification. The high priority assigned to this objective is readily apparent in the
preference given to the family members of U.S. citizens and permanent residents in
immigrating to the United States." FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13, § 3:1, at 2.
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necessary part of this process. 37 Citizens or LPRs may submit this
particular form on behalf of the immediate relative as a way to establish the
necessary qualifying family relationship to an alien relative who desires to
immigrate to the United States. 38 "Evidence of the relationship is usually
required and, in some cases, evidence of the petitioner's status as a citizen
'39
or resident is also required.
If the U.S. citizen dies without having filed the necessary Form 1-130
petition on behalf of his or her alien spouse, the widowed alien spouse may
self-petition for classification as an "immediate relative" by filing a Form I40
360 (Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant).
However, there are four qualifications an alien widow or widower must
meet in order to self-petition. 4 1 One crucial condition is that "[h]e or she
had been married for at least two years to a United States citizen," at the
time of the citizen's death. 4 2 Another essential aspect of the immigration
process worth noting is that a filed spousal Form 1-130 is automatically
converted to a widow(er)'s Form 1-360 if, on the date of the petitioner's
death, the couple was married for at least two years and the beneficiary is
otherwise eligible. 43 This automatic conversion applies, regardless of
44
whether the citizen spouse dies before or after approval of the Form 1-130.
Once the Form 1-130 petition is prepared, the papers are mailed to a
USCIS service center with jurisdiction over the place of residence of the
petitioner. 4 5 It is the responsibility of USCIS to investigate the merits and
determine eligibility to approve the petition. 46 In the course of the
investigation, USCIS may conduct a field examination, interview the

37. See 8 U.S.C. § l154(a)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(1), 204.2(a) (2008). A
noncitizen spouse is considered an "alien spouse" for purposes of obtaining permanent
resident status. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(g)(1).
38. Petition

for

Alien

Relative,

http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/

(follow

"Immigration Forms"; then follow hyperlink "Petition for Alien Relative") (last visited Feb.
23, 2009).
39. CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 1.03[2][e][ii][F] (rev. ed. 1966); see 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(f)(1). Such
evidence is usually required to show that the marriage is not a "sham." See GORDON ET AL.,
supra, § 1.03[2][e][iii[F]. "Misrepresentations regarding an alien's marital status made in
seeking admission to the United States constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546." 18B
Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 45:2620 (1999); see also Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § I154(a)(l)(A)(ii) (stating that "[a]n alien spouse described in the

second sentence of section 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) ...also may file a petition).
41. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13, § 3:3.1, at 43.
42. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(b)(1).
43. Id. §§ 204.2(i)(1)(iv), 205. l(a)(3)(i)(C)(I).
44. Id. Thus, the specific conflict discussed by this Note does not involve cases where
the marriage lasted for more than two years prior to the petitioner's death. Rather, the
relevant dispute implicates marriages in which the citizen spouse died prior to their two-year
wedding anniversary but filed the necessary paperwork.
45. 8 C.F.R. § 316.3. Although the statute says the petition is filed with the "Attorney
General," 8 U.S.C. § I154(a)(l)(A)(i), the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296 § 45 1(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2196, transferred this authority to USCIS.
46. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13, § 3:1.2, at 8.
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parties, or request that additional evidence be submitted. 47 There are no
numerical limitations placed upon the immigration of immediate relatives
48
of U.S. citizens as there are on other categories of immigrants.
b. Becoming a PermanentResident: 1-485 Application to Register
PermanentResidence or Adjust Status
Once an 1-130 petition is approved under the family-sponsored visa
allocation system, then the next step on the road to citizenship is completed
and aliens may apply for an immigration visa (if the alien is abroad), 49 or
seek an adjustment of status to that of an LPR (if the alien is present in the
United States). 50 In order to accomplish the latter, the alien can file an 5I485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status. '
Sometimes, an alien spouse will file the Form 1-485 application at the same
time their citizen spouse files the Form 1-130 petition in order to expedite
the process. 52 However, this may only be done if the sponsored alien is
physically present in the United States and an immigrant visa is
"immediately available." 53 If an immigrant visa is not "immediately
available," then USCIS cannot adjudicate the Form 1-485 application, and
the petition must be filed separately. 54 However, physical presence in the
United States is really the determining factor. For immediate relatives of
American citizens, visas always are deemed to be "immediately available"
55
because there are no numerical caps on their admission as immigrants.
If the adjustment of status application is approved, then the alien will be
admitted to permanent residence temporarily until he or she is processed for
an alien registration receipt card (a "green card"). 56 Approval of the 1-485
application is dependent upon the approval of the 1-130 visa petition; the
denial of the petition makes the beneficiary ineligible for an adjustment of
status.57 Section 1155 of the U.S. Code contemplates that USCIS may
revoke approval of an 1-130 visa petition at any time for "good and
sufficient cause."5 8 Further regulations beyond this statute provide that a
47. Id. § 3:3, at 36-37.

48. Id. § 3:1, at 2. There is, however, an overall cap for family-sponsored immigrants at
480,000. Id. § 3:1, at 6.
49. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202(a).
50. See id. § 1255(a).
51. See id. For a more in depth analysis of 1-485 applications, see Lauren E. Sasser,
Note, Waiting in Immigration Limbo: The Federal Court Split over Suits to Compel Action
on Stalled Adjustment of Status Applications, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2008).
52. See, e.g., Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006); Lockhart v.
Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2008).
53. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13, § 3:1.2, at 9.
54. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1033; FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13, § 3:1.2, at 9.

55. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 13, § 2:10.2, at 127.
56. Id. § 3:1.2, at 9.
57. Id. § 3:3, at 27 ("USCIS must first adjudicate the alien's eligibility for immigration
under the family-sponsored visa allocation system before the alien may actually apply for...
adjustment of status to permanent resident.").
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1155 (2006).
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petitioner's death automatically revokes approval of an 1-130 visa
petition.59 The current regulations also permit the U.S. Secretary of State to
leave a predeath approval undisturbed (or alternatively, to reinstate
approval). 60
However, this discretionary provision does not provide
authority for approving a Form 1-130 petition if the visa petitioner dies
61
while the Form 1-130 is pending.
B. The Road to FederalCourt
If an 1-130 petition is denied, the petitioner may file an appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 6 2 "the highest administrative body
for interpreting and applying immigration laws."'63 The Board then can
render a final administrative decision on the matter. 64 However, the BIA
does not have the jurisdiction to rule on an 1-130 petition if it is brought by
a beneficiary and not by the petitioner. 6 5 There is also no administrative
appeal if a petitioner's Application to Adjust Status, Form 1-485, is
denied.66
An alien who files to adjust his status through an 1-485
application may renew the adjustment of status application in removal
(deportation) proceedings 6 7 before the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR). However, initiation of these proceedings is at the sole
68
discretion of DHS, and one cannot apply for their initiation.
69
In 1952, the INA "had no specific provision for federal court review."
Until fairly recently, there were myriad means for judicial oversight. One
such method was a habeas corpus action in a federal district court followed
by further review in a federal appellate court. 70 There were also other
alternative federal remedies such as mandamus, declaratory relief, or
injunctive relief. 71 However, in 1996 and 2005, Congress enacted three
separate statutes that "significantly impacted" the arena of judicial review
of immigration laws. 72 Together, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 73 the Illegal Immigration Reform and

59. 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C) (2008).
60. Id.
61. Dodig v. INS, 9 F.3d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1993).

62. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(5).
63. Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2009).
64. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(H)(ii).
65. See In re Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 299 (BIA 1985).
66. 8 CFR § 245.2(a)(5)(ii); Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D. Mass.
2007).

67. For a detailed discussion of removal (deportation) proceedings, see 8 C.F.R. § 240.
68. See Cortez-Felipe v. INS, 245 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The Attorney

General has discretion regarding when and whether to initiate deportation proceedings.").
69. BOSWELL, supra note 23, at 163.
70. Id.; see, e.g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953); Chin Yow v. United States,
208 U.S. 8 (1908).
71. BOSWELL, supra note 23, at 163.
72. Id.
73. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1272-73 (1996).
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Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), 74 and the REAL ID Act
of 2005,75 have severely limited judicial review. Currently, only three legal
remedies remain: "(1) direct petitions for review to the appellate courts of
all final orders of removal; (2) habeas corpus in district court where the
matter being challenged involves constitutional claims or questions of law;
and (3) certain mandamus and declaratory actions brought in an appropriate
federal district court."' 76 The line of cases this Note analyzes fall within the
latter two appeals processes.
C. Statute in Controversy: 8 U.S.C. § 1151
The issue addressed by this Note surrounds the intersection of Form I130 petitions and 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), the statute under which a
U.S. citizen or LPR can petition immigration authorities to adjust the status
of an alien who is their immediate relative. The specific contention
involves the definition of immediate relative in the statute and what, if any,
requirements a spouse must meet in order to be classified as such. This
Note focuses on a specific set of circumstances-when an 1-130 petition has
been filed properly, but was not adjudicated prior to the petitioner's death.
Can the surviving wife or husband still be considered a spouse under the
statute?
An immediate relative is defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) as
follows:
Immediate relatives.-For purposes of this subsection, the term
"immediate relatives" means the children, spouses, and parents of a
citizen of the United States, except that, in the case of parents, such
citizens shall be at least 21 years of age. In the case of an alien who was
the spouse of a citizen of the United States for at least 2 years at the time
of the citizen's death and was not legally separated from the citizen at the
time of the citizen's death, the alien (and each child of the alien) shall be
considered, for purposes of this subsection, to remain an immediate
relative after the date of the citizen's death but only if the spouse files a
petition under section 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) of this title within
2 years after
77
such date and only until the date the spouse remarries.
Spouse, in turn, is defined in title 1, § 7 of the U.S. Code: "the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife." '78 It is then further discussed at § 1101(a)(35) of the Code, as
follows: "The term 'spouse', 'wife', or 'husband' do not include a spouse,
wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where the contracting
parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other,
'79
unless the marriage shall have been consummated.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 (1996).
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231,310-11 (2005).
BOSWELL, supra note 23, at 165.
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(35).
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Notably, the latter explanation "has not changed since its original

enactment in 1952 and is a negative definition which does not preclude
common understandings of the term." 80
The two-year durational
8
requirement in § 1151 was added in the 1990 amendments to the INA,

considered the most comprehensive reform of immigration laws in sixty-six
years. 82 One main purpose of the amendments was to establish "procedures

83
to deter fraud by aliens seeking permanent resident status in the U.S.,"
and specifically to address the widespread concern regarding aliens' use of

84
sham marriages to acquire "green cards" for permanent residence.

Subsection (b) of § 1151 goes on to "define[] several categories of aliens,

including 'immediate relatives,' who are not subject to the numerical
limitations in the INA." 85 This section was "enacted as part of the
Immigration Reform Act of 1965 and is intended to ensure that relatives of
U.S. citizens and legal aliens are allowed to enter and remain in the United

States."

86

D. The Scope of JudicialReview ofAgency Action

"More than at any time in recent years, a threshold question-the scope
of judicial review-has become one of the most vexing in regulatory

cases."8 7 The extent of judicial review for USCIS's definition of "spouse"
in § 1151 (b)(2)(a)(i) for immediate relative purposes is the central focus of
this Note's analysis. 88
If the Agency's interpretation is entitled to
deference, that would legally end the matter. Although legislative action
would remain a possibility, complete deference to the Agency's
interpretation would preclude any further action in the federal courts. Thus,
it is imperative to discuss the general legal theory underlying judicial

review of agency action.

80. Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and in Support of CrossMotion for Summary Judgment at 6, Robinson v. Chertoff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34956
(D.N.J. May 14, 2007) (No. 06-5702) [hereinafter Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition
to MTD].
81. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4980 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C.§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)).
82. Remarks on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
1946 (Dec. 3, 1990) (statement of President George W. Bush upon signing S.358).
83. Cong. Info. Serv., Inc., Legislative History of P.L. 101-649, CIS No. 90-PL101-649,
101 CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 649 (LEXIS).
84. Harden, supra note 1.
85. Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *5 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 7, 2008).
86. Id.; see S. REP. No. 748 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3329-32.
87. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 190 (2006).
88. The Agency interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1l51(b)(2)(A)(i) was set forth in In re
Varela, 13 I. & N. Dec. 453 (BIA 1970). The Board of Immigration Appeals held in that
case that an alien spouse was no longer a "spouse" under the statute because her citizen
husband died prior to the adjudication of her adjustment of status application. Id. at 454. See
infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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1. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)8 9 describes the standards a
court must apply when reviewing agency findings. The Act recognizes
different standards depending on whether a court is reviewing questions of
law or questions of fact. 90 In the line of cases at issue there are no
disputable questions of fact. Rather, the statutory issue the court must
resolve is purely a matter of law.9 1 In North American Industries, Inc. v.
Feldman,92 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained the
role of the federal courts in the specific context of reviewing immigrant
petitions. The court acknowledged that a decision to grant or deny an
immigrant petition was within the discretion of the INS, and therefore a
federal court could only overturn such a decision if the INS abused its
discretion (such as by basing its decision on an improper understanding of
the law). 93 The court went on to state,

While it is true that an appellate court must give great deference to the
construction accorded a statute by the agency charged with its
administration, deference to an agency's interpretation of the law does not
equate with blind faith. A court is obliged to accept the administrative
construction of a statute only so far as it is reasonable, and consistent with
the intent of Congress in adopting the statute. Thus, if the agency's
interpretation of the statue is found to be inconsistent with the statutory
language, legislative history, or purpose of the statute, it must be
invalidated. Moreover, an 94
administrative decision based on erroneous
legal standards cannot stand.
Under the APA, the final word on statutory interpretation resides in the
courts, which may substitute their judgment on questions of law for that of

89. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
90. See Local 144, Hotel, Hosp. Nursing Home & Allied Servs. Union v. NLRB, 9 F.3d
218, 221 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[C]ourts have the final say in matters of statutory interpretation...
and an administrative agency, like the National Labor Relations Board, is bound to follow
the law of the Circuit." (citing Ithaca Coll. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir. 1980))). But
see Hyatt Corp. v. NLRB, 939 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1991) (observing that "'[the court's]
scope of review over administrative decisions is limited and we are entitled to have the
benefits of the Board's expertise in this area before we are called upon to rule on important
questions of law and policy' (quoting Flav-o-Rich, Inc. v. NLRB, 531 F.2d 358, 362 (6th
Cir. 1976))).
91. See Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *4 (3d
Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) ("[T]his is a 'purely legal question and does not implicate agency
discretion."' (quoting Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 204 (3d Cir. 2005))); Lockhart v.
Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *12-13 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2008)
("This is purely an issue of law because the parties do not dispute the only facts relevant to
its resolution.").
92. 722 F.2d 893 (1st Cir. 1983).
93. Id. at 898.
94. Id. at 899-99 (citations omitted).
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the agency when it is determined under the relevant standard of review that
the agency's interpretation must be reversed. 95
2. Chevron Deference: Steps Zero Through Two
The leading case on the scope of judicial review of agency statutory
construction is the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Research Defense Council, Inc. There, the Court prescribed
two inquiries that a reviewing court should conduct when reviewing an
96
agency's construction of a statute that it is responsible for administering.
First, a court must consider whether "Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue." 9 7 If the intent of Congress is clear, then the court
need not inquire any further, "for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. ' 98 This "Step
One" inquiry "ensures that agencies will lose if Congress has clearly
forbidden them from acting as they have chosen." 99 However, if Congress
"has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,"' 0 0 and therefore
the statute is silent or ambiguous, then the court must move onto the second
step. The crucial determination then becomes whether "the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute" in light of the
underlying law.' 01 "Step Two operates as a safeguard against insufficiently
justified interpretations."' 1 2 This two-pronged standard is commonly
referred to as "Chevron deference." Since the statutory interpretation
advanced by the government in the issue at hand is that adopted by its
agency, USCIS, this Note considers whether that interpretation is entitled to
Chevron deference.
Cases have applied Chevron in a variety of ways over the years, and thus
the role it takes in each case is often unpredictable. 10 3 "'Chevron
deference... is not accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous and
an administrative official is involved.""' 10 4 Ambiguity itself is usually a
matter of degree. 10 5
However, there is "a more or less orderly
framework"' 106 that makes one thing fairly clear: courts will not defer to an
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) ("To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action.").
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Id. at 842.
98. Id. at 842-43.
99. Sunstein, supra note 87, at 228.
100. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
101. Id.
102. Sunstein, supra note 87, at 228.
103. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: IN A

NUTSHELL 83, 90 (5th ed. 2006).
104. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006)).
105. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 103, at 84.
106. Id. at90.
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agency's interpretation of a statute "'if Congress' intent can be clearly
ascertained through analysis of the language, purpose and structure of the
107
statute."'
Over time, judicial attention and academic debate has not focused solely
on Chevron's two-step inquiry, but additionally on what Professors Thomas
10 8
W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have termed "Chevron Step Zero."
This initial step is the threshold question: does Chevron apply at all?
Through a number of cases, the Supreme Court has carved out certain
exceptions where Chevron does not provide the governing framework and
thus courts will not use the two-pronged test to review agency
First, under some circumstances, the
interpretations of law. 10 9
responsibility to interpret the statute does not lie with the agency because
the statute does not grant it such power. This lack of agency discretionary
authority makes Chevron deference inapplicable." 0 Another exception
regarding the applicability of the Chevron standard of review concerns the
"format" or type of pronouncement in which the interpretation has been
articulated."' Opinion letters and other "interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference." 1 2 For
example, statements found in tariff ruling letters, issued without formal3
processes and carrying no precedential weight, will lack the force of law. "1
Statements made in opinion letters and their analogues have, at maximum,
the "power to persuade." 1 4 However, formal adjudications or final rules
after notice-and-comment would normally qualify for Chevron
deference;' 1 5 the grant16of such authority usually is considered a grant to act
1
with the force of law.
The Court has not provided a clear explanation of what it means by
"force of law," but has made clear that it is only a sufficient, not necessary
condition for Chevron applicability.11 7 In Barnhart v. Walton,118 the Court
107. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 421 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2005)).
108. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
836 (2001). For a detailed analysis of "Chevron Step Zero," see Sunstein, supra note 87.
109. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 103, at 90.
110. Id. at 90-91; see, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944)
("Congress did not utilize the services of an administrative agency to find facts and to
determine in the first instance whether particular cases fall within or without the Act.
Instead, it put this responsibility on the courts.").
111. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 103, at 91-93.

112. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
113. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).

114. Id. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
115. See id. at 230.
116. The Court in United States v. Mead Corp. recommended that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. apply "when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Id. at
226-27.
117. See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 218.
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upheld a Social Security Administration interpretation not based upon
notice-and-comment rulemaking, but on an agency manual, informal ruling,
and a letter. 119 Thus, it made clear that Chevron could still be utilized as
the governing framework even when the agency was not acting with the
force of law. 120 The Court mentioned a number of factors, such as the
interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the agency,
and the consideration the agency has given the question over a period of
' 12 1
time, that bear on whether Chevron provides "the appropriate legal lens."
According to Professor Cass R. Sunstein, the "real question is Congress's
(implied) instructions in the particularstatutory scheme., 1 22 The Supreme
Court has expressed its desire for flexibility as to whether something can
qualify for Chevron deference. 123 Likely, whether Chevron deference is
applicable to an agency determination will depend on the circumstances of
an individual case. 124 Ultimately, "the judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions
which are contrary to clear congressional intent."' 125
E. The Basis of USCIS's Interpretationof 8 U.S.C. § 1151
The interpretation adopted by USCIS of what requirements a spouse
must meet to attain "immediate relative" status under 8 U.S.C. § 1151 was
established in the BIA decision of In re Varela.126 Beyond Varela, the BIA
has not otherwise addressed the statutory question at issue. 12 7 Whether the
decision in Varela is entitled to Chevron deference is at the heart of the
debate explored by this Note.
1. In re Varela
Varela was a 1970 BIA decision regarding whether an alien remained the
spouse of a U.S. citizen who had died of a heart attack while on active duty
in the U.S. Armed Forces a few months after their wedding.' 28 The BIA
ruled that the District Director properly denied the petition because "at the
time of his decision the beneficiary was not the spouse of a United States

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

535 U.S. 212 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 221-22.
Sunstein, supra note 87, at 217 (quoting Barnhart,535 U.S. at 222).
Id. at218.

123. See Barnhart,535 U.S. at 217 ("Courts grant an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations considerable legal leeway."); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227,
228 (2001) (holding that delegated authority from Congress "may be shown in a variety of
ways" and that "[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute
has been understood to vary with circumstances").
124. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 103, at 93.
125. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984).
126. 13 I. & N. Dec. 453 (BIA 1970).
127. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006).
128. In re Varela, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 453.
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citizen. His death had stripped her of that status. ' 129 Although the majority
features" of the case, it nonetheless ordered
was aware of the "sympathetic
130
that the appeal be dismissed.
One board member, Thomas J. Griffin, wrote a separate opinion
In a
regarding the BIA's own jurisdiction in issuing the ruling.
13
1
"It
is
my
position
that
the
In
re
Sano,
Griffin
wrote,
foreshadowing of
to
this
Board.
an
appeal
appellant herein has no legal standing to prosecute
any consideration of the merits of the appeal is totally
Accordingly, 132
unwarranted."
2. In re Sano
Fifteen years later, the BIA modified Varela in In re Sano. 133 In the
latter case, the BIA found that the review in Varela was improper because
the BIA had no appellate jurisdiction to decide the case. 134 The Board
stated that its appellate jurisdiction was defined by 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b), 135 and
that if the regulations did not affirmatively grant it the power to act in a
particular manner, than it had no appellate jurisdiction. 13 6 Specifically, it
noted that 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(3) spoke only of "the petitioner's right to
appeal to the Board."' 137 Therefore, the BIA concluded that it "lack[ed]
jurisdiction to address an appeal by the beneficiary from the denial of a visa
petition."' 138 It went on to directly characterize its decision in Varela as
extent its decision conflicted with its
"inappropriate" and stated that, to the 139
modified."
"hereby
was
it
conclusion,
As a result of this decision, none of the cases discussed in this Noteincluding Freeman and Robinson-were brought before the Board of
Immigration Appeals. Unlike the alien wife in Varela, who had the
140
opportunity to appeal the District Director's decision administratively,
the beneficiaries after Sano were forced to resort to strictly judicial means
of recovery. Thus, although two of the rejected beneficiaries initially filed

129. Id. at 454.

130. Id. at 455.
131. 19 1.&N. Dec. 299 (BIA 1985).
132. In re Varela, 13 1. & N. Dec. at 455 (separate opinion by Board Member Thomas J.
Griffin).
133. 19 1.& N. Dec. at 301.
134. Id.; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
135. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1985) (stating that "[a]ppeals shall lie to the Board of Immigration
Appeals from ... [d]ecisions on petitions filed in accordance with section 204 of the act...
as provided in Parts 204 and 205, respectively, of this chapter").
136. In re Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
137. Id. at 300. 8 C.F.R. 204.1(a)(3) states in its entirety that, "[t]he petitioner will be
notified of the decision, and, if the petition is denied, of the reasons for the denial, and of the
petitioner's right to appeal to the Board within 15 days after mailing the notification of the
decision."
138. In re Sano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 301.
139. Id. at 300-01.
140. In re Varela, 13 I. & N. Dec. 453, 453 (BIA 1970).
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14 1 all of the
motions to INS/USCIS directly to reconsider its decision,
142
beneficiaries ultimately filed suit in a federal district court.

F. Controversy in the Courts: Facts of the Cases in the CircuitSplit
Within the context of the courtroom, the rejected beneficiaries and the
government have confronted each other regarding the correct interpretation
of "spouse" in 8 U.S.C. § 1 151(b)(2)(A)(i). The conflict between USCIS
and the judiciary has been demonstrated in six cases thus far, with no clear
consensus in the verdicts. The first of these cases was Freeman v.
Gonzales, discussed at length in this Note's introduction. 143 The facts of
the case, as well as its holding and rationale, are summarized in this section.
This section also discusses the basic facts of the other cases in this
controversy, including Robinson v. Napolitano, as well as what makes two
44
of them distinct. 1
Mrs. Freeman, a dual citizen of South Africa and Italy, married Mr.
Freeman, a U.S. citizen, in February 2001.145 In September of that year,
Mr. Freeman filed a Form 1-130 petition on his wife's behalf in order to
establish her current spousal status. 146 While the application was pending,
Mr. Freeman was killed in a car accident. 14 7 This incident occurred within
a year after their marriage began. In September of 2004, the District
Director of USCIS ruled that Mrs. Freeman could no longer qualify for an
adjustment of status because she was a widow and therefore technically no
longer a spouse for purposes of the INA. 148 She was ordered to leave the
49
United States. 1
Mrs. Freeman petitioned for and was denied a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal district court, so she appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 150 The Ninth
Circuit recognized that the BIA decision, relied upon by the district court
below, ruled in the opposite manner as that urged by the petitioner. 15 1
However, in applying the Chevron standard of deference to an agency
interpretation, the Ninth Circuit concluded that neither prong of the
Chevron test was satisfied because (1)the intent of Congress was clear
141. Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *4 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 7, 2008) ("Ms. Lockhart filed a motion to re-open and reconsider the denial of the Form
1-130 petition on November 20, 2006."); Burger v. McElroy, No. 97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999) ("[P]laintiffs filed a motion for the INS to
reconsider its decision ....
").
142. See, e.g., Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006).
143. See supra notes 1, 3-8 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
145. Freeman,444 F.3d at 1032.
146. Id. at 1033. On that same day, Mrs. Carla Freeman filed an Application to Register
Permanent Resident or Adjust Status (Form 1-485), which initiated the formal process to
adjust her status to a Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR). See id
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.

151. See In re Varela, 13 1. & N. Dec. 453, 455 (BIA 1970).
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based on the plain language of the statute, and (2) "the BIA's interpretation,
to the extent it [was] entitled to some deference, [was] not a permissible
construction of the statute."' 52 The court then reviewed the language,
structure, purpose, and application of the statute and concluded "that
Congress clearly intended an alien widow whose citizen spouse has filed
the necessary forms to be and to remain an immediate relative (spouse) for
purposes of § 115l1(b)(2)(A)(i), even if the citizen spouse dies with two
53
years of the marriage." 1
Beyond Freeman, the five subsequent cases forming this circuit split all
follow a similar fact pattern, and therefore it is unnecessary to discuss the
specifics of each. The cases 154 all involve suits by Form 1-130 beneficiaries
claiming that their petitions and dependent 1-485 applications were
unlawfully denied. In each case, an alien wed a U.S. citizen 155 and
subsequently the citizen spouse filed the Form 1-130 petition and the alien
spouse filed an 1-485 application. 156 Both were done so that the alien

152. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1038.
153. Id. at 1039.
154. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946 (3d Cir. Feb. 2,
2009); Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7,
2008), appeal docketed, No. 08-3321 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2008); Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F.
Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 08-1179 (1st Cir. Feb. 11, 2008); Turek
v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 450 F. Supp. 2d 736 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Burger v. McElroy, No.
97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999).
155. As mentioned in the Introduction, Mrs. Osserritta Robinson was a citizen of Jamaica
and Mr. Louis Robinson was a citizen of the United States. The couple got married in
February 2003. Robinson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *1. Nelly Supangan Ando (Mrs.
Lockhart), a citizen of the Philippines, married a U.S. citizen, Mr. Gerald Lockhart, on
January 20, 2004. Lockhart, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *2. Mrs. Neang Chea Taing, a
citizen of Cambodia, married a naturalized U.S. citizen of Cambodian heritage named Mr.
Techumsen Chip Taing on October 4, 2004. Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79. Jerzy Turek
was married to a Polish woman, Jadwiga Turek, but filed for divorce on March 21, 2003.
Turek was arrested and placed in removal proceedings on May 28, 2003, and finally received
a divorce from his first wife on June 4, 2003. Approximately one month later, on July 11,
2003, Turek married a United States citizen, Diane Turek. Turek, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
Mrs. Sanja Burger, a citizen of Serbia, entered the United States with her daughter Milica
Savic on June 12, 1996, on visitor visas. Burger, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *2.
Approximately one month later, on July 20, 1996, Mrs. Burger married a citizen of the
United States named Stephen Burger. Id. at *3.
156. In March of 2003, Mr. Robinson filed an 1-130 petition, and Mrs. Robinson filed an
1-485 application, so that her status could be adjusted to that of a permanent resident,
Robinson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *2. On February 1, 2004, Mr. Lockhart filed a
Form 1-130 petition with USCIS to attest to the fact that Mrs. Lockhart was his spouse and
therefore would qualify as an "immediate relative." On that same day, Mrs. Lockhart filed
her Form 1-485 Application to Adjust Status. Lockhart, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *2.
In December of 2004, Mr. Taing filed an 1-130 immigrant visa petition on behalf of his wife,
and Mrs. Taing filed the 1-485 adjustment of status application. Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d at
179. Mrs. Taing also filed a request for work authorization, which was immediately granted.
Id. On September 4, 1996, Mr. Burger filed an 1-130 Petition on behalf of his wife and stepdaughter. On the same date, Mrs. Burger and her daughter filed the 1-485 adjustment of
status petitions. Burger, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *3. The Turek v. Department of
Homeland Security opinion makes no mentioning of when any petition or applications were
filed.
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spouse's status could be adjusted to that of an LPR. 157 However, before the
applications were approved and before the couples celebrated their two-year
wedding anniversary, the citizen spouses were killed in a variety of
circumstances:
Mr. Robinson was killed in a Staten Island Ferry
accident, 158 Mr. Techumsen Chip Taing died suddenly of a stroke, 159 Mr.
Gerald Lockhart suffered a fatal heart attack, 160 and Mr. Stephen Burger
passed away from far advanced metastatic lung cancer. 16 1 The cause of
Mrs. Diane Turek's death is unclear from the court's opinion.
In every case, as per USCIS policy, the Form 1-130 petition was denied
(and as a result, the alien spouse's dependent 1-485 application was also
denied). 162 USCIS consistently based its decision solely upon the death of
the citizen spouse, claiming that the alien was no longer a spouse of a U.S.
citizen and therefore no longer entitled to "immediate relative" status under
163
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
There are only two important factual distinctions between these cases that
are worth noting. The first feature involves Turek v. Department of
Homeland Security, 164 one of two post-Freeman decisions to rule in favor
of USCIS. In Turek, the alien (Jerzy Turek) was arrested and placed in
removal proceedings while he was married to his first wife; he received a
divorce shortly thereafter.165 Approximately one month later, Jerzy married
a U.S. citizen, Diane Turek. 166 The court in this case noted that the timing
of the marriage, because it was entered into while in removal proceedings,
raised a presumption that the marriage was not entered into in good faith. 16 7

157. The opinion in Lockhart v. Chertoff also mentions that approximately one year after
the petition and application were filed, USCIS interviewed Mr. and Mrs. Lockhart and
requested additional evidence from Mrs. Lockhart. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *3-4.
158. Semple, supra note 2.
159. Complaint at 4, Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177 (No. 1:07-cv-10499).
160. Lockhart, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *4.
161. Burger, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *4.
162. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Burger, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *5 (discussing INS's denial letter,

which stated, "you can no longer be classified as the spouse of a United States citizen as the
relationship the petition seeks to establish no longer exists").
164. 450 F. Supp. 2d 736 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
165. Id. at 739; seesupra note 155.
166. Turek, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 739; see supra note 155.
167. Turek, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 739-40.
Plaintiff's marriage was presumptively fraudulent because he entered into the
marriage in question after he was placed in removal proceedings.... Indeed,
Plaintiff had divorced his wife, Jadwiga Turek, the mother of his two minor
children, Lukasz and Mateusz[,] . . . after he had been placed in removal
proceedings.
... [T]he court finds that the timing of Plaintiffs marriage to Diane Turek
raises a presumption that the marriage was not done in good faith. Federal law
makes clear that an immediate relative petition cannot be granted if the marriage in
question was entered into while the alien was in removal proceedings unless the
alien can establish with clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was
entered into in good faith.
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The second relevant distinction involves Burger v. McElroy, 168 another
decision that supports the Agency's position. Burger is an unpublished,
lower court opinion that predates Freeman.169 Furthermore, it does not
address, or even analyze, § 1151(b)(1)(A)(i). 170 It relies on the BIA
decision in Varela, but does not mention the jurisdictional issue raised by
71

Sano.1

The rejected beneficiaries have pointed to these factual distinctions as a
way to minimize any relevance of the two decisions. However, USCIS has
consistently relied upon these precedents to support their position.
G. USCIS's Policy Reconfirmed After Freeman
After the ruling in Freeman, Mike Aytes, the Associate Director of
Domestic Operations for USCIS, issued an interoffice memorandum to
"Field Leadership." The memorandum's subject was the "Effect of Form I130 Petitioner's Death on Authority to Approve the Form 1-130," and a
portion was dedicated to making revisions to the "Adjudicators Field
Manual (AFM) Chapter 21.2."172 The stated purpose was to reaffirm
USCIS's policy and the traditional view-that if a Form 1-130 visa
petitioner dies before USCIS acts on the petition, then USCIS must deny
the form-for cases brought in states other than Alaska, Arizona,
California, Idaho, Guam, Hawaii, Northern Marianas, Nevada, Montana,
Oregon, and Washington (the Ninth Circuit).1 73 The memorandum
acknowledged that USCIS was legally obligated to follow a "supervening
precedent decision of a court of appeals," and therefore USCIS adjudicators
would have to treat the Freeman precedent as controlling for cases within
the Ninth Circuit.' 74 However, the memorandum strongly reminded USCIS
adjudicators that they should not follow Freeman in cases arising outside of
the Ninth Circuit. 175 Aytes also wrote a harsh criticism of the Freeman

Id. at 739-40 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(g) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(iii) (2008)). The
plaintiff claimed that he was able to prove that his marriage was not fraudulent because he
filed for divorce from his Polish wife prior to being placed in removal proceedings. Id. at
739. Regardless, the court stated that, even if it were to follow the Freeman v. Gonzales
holding, the petitioner was not able to overcome this bad faith presumption. Id. at 740.
168. No. 97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999).
169. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 24, Robinson v. Chertoff, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
1946 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) (No. 06-5702) [hereinafter Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief].
Although Burger v.McElroy was handed down prior to Freeman, it is consistent with
USCIS's policy and therefore will be discussed as contributing to the split in the federal
courts.

170. Id.
171. Id. at 24n.2.
172. Memorandum from Mike Aytes, Assoc. Dir. of Domestic Operations, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Servs. to Field Leadership (Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Aytes
Memorandum], available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/I130AFMAD08041 10
807.pdf.
173. Id.at 1.
174. Id.at 1-2.
175. Id.at 1.
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decision, believing it to be "wrongly decided."' 176 According to Aytes, "A
person who had been married is no longer, legally, a 'spouse' once the other
spouse has died. Moreover. ... the Ninth Circuit failed to give the
deference to the Board's interpretation of the statute that,
under decisions of
77
the Supreme Court, a court is legally bound to give."'
The practical effect of this memorandum is that it will probably be
followed everywhere outside of the Ninth Circuit, regardless of the
decisions in Lockhart v. Chertof[178 and Taing v. Chertoff.179 The
memorandum explicitly stated that USCIS is legally obligated to follow
precedent of the BIA "in the absence of a supervening precedent decision of
a court of appeals."' 180 Thus, because Lockhart and Taing are district court
decisions, not court of appeals decisions, the district adjudicators will likely
ignore their rulings in cases outside of the Ninth Circuit. 18 1 In the Third
Circuit especially, because of the recent court of appeals ruling in Robinson,
USCIS's policy will most certainly be followed. Additionally, it is possible
that the policy reconfirmed in the memorandum could be followed inside of
the Ninth Circuit as well as long as the facts of a case are distinguishable
from Freeman. Aytes specifically wrote a caveat in his memorandum that
within the Ninth Circuit, USCIS adjudicators should follow Freeman only
182
"in cases involving the same essential facts."'
II. SEEING THE WIDOW PENALTY CONTROVERSY THROUGH THE LENS OF
CHEVRON

The essence of the conflict analyzed in this Note is a clash between an
administrative agency and the judiciary, and the subsequent circuit split in
the federal courts. The Agency, USCIS, has consistently urged for one
interpretation of a statute over which it is responsible for administering;
however, certain federal courts have disregarded this interpretation and
made an independent determination as to the correct definition of a term in
the relevant statute. Ever since the disagreement between the Ninth Circuit
in Freeman and USCIS's responding memorandum, the battle has
continued as the courts outside of the Ninth Circuit have been in conflict
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1-2 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984)).
178. No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2008), appeal

docketed, No. 08-3321 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2008).
179. 526 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 08-1179 (1st Cir. Feb.
11,2008).
180. Aytes Memorandum, supra note 172, at 1.
181. Charles H. Kuck & Ana C. Aleman, Ana C. Aleman & Charles H. Kuck on Taing v.
Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2007), 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2855, at *3 (LEXIS),

Aug. 4, 2008; see Aytes Memorandum, supra note 172, at 6 ("USCIS will not... consider
the district court judgment to be a binding precedent for any subsequent case, since the
Board has held that district court judgments do not have binding effect for other cases."

(citing In re K-S-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 715 (BIA 1993))).
182. Aytes Memorandum, supra note 172, at 1.
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over the appropriate definition of "immediate relative" and "spouse" under
8 U.S.C. § 1151, and what deference is owed, if any, to USCIS's
interpretation. Most notably, two district courts in the First and Sixth
Circuits have directly followed the holding in Freeman as well as its
reasoning.' 83 However, there are two significant district court cases, which
the government has consistently relied upon, to support the interpretation of
USCIS in regard to this debate.' 8 4 Additionally, the Third Circuit has
recently handed down a decision recognizing the validity of the Agency's
statutory construction. 185 The court cases discussed in this part have
illuminated the debate between the Agency and the judiciary. On one side,
the rejected beneficiaries have urged the courts to follow the Freeman
precedent and rule against the Agency's interpretation. On the other side,
the Agency (and more broadly, the government itself) has insisted that the
courts demonstrate deference to USCIS's interpretation of the statute. Part
II of this Note thoroughly analyzes both perspectives and also discusses the
results reached by the various district and appellate courts.
Specifically, this section analyzes the various arguments on both sides of
(1) whether USCIS's
the debate concerning three main issues:
In
re Varela qualifies for
BIA
decision
interpretation established in the
if
Chevron deference is
Chevron deference (Chevron Step Zero); (2)
to
the precise question at
spoken
applicable, whether Congress has clearly
whether the
is
ambiguous,
the
statute
and
(3)
if
issue (Chevron Step One);
and
permissible
reasonable
Agency's understanding is based upon a
court
of
the
relevant
Most
Step
Two).
construction of the statute (Chevron
and
the
the
petitioners'
opinions do not satisfactorily address all of
all
analyze
and
government's arguments. Thus, in order to fully discuss
the
briefs
to
references
makes
substantial
relevant considerations, this Note
submitted by opposing sides in a majority of the cases.
A. Step Zero: Does Chevron Deference Apply?
As discussed in Part I, the appropriate standard of review by a federal
court when reviewing administrative agency actions can vary depending on
several circumstances. 186 If it is found by a federal court that Chevron
deference is not applicable, then it is proper for the court to substitute its
own judgment on questions of law for that of the agency. 187 However,
183. See Lockhart, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889; Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d
177.
184. See Turek v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 450 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2006);
Burger v. McElroy, No. 97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
12, 1999).
185. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946 (3d Cir. Feb. 2,
2009).
186. See supra notes 103, 109 and accompanying text.
187. Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 945 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Questions of law that can
be answered with 'traditional tools of statutory construction' are within the special expertise
of courts, not agencies, and are therefore answered by the court de novo." (quoting INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446 (1989))).
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before a court even reaches the two-pronged test of Chevron, it is necessary
to answer the threshold question of whether Chevron applies at all, a step
that has been titled "Chevron Step Zero."' 188 Determining whether Chevron
provides the appropriate governing framework requires an analysis of the
BIA decision embodying USCIS's policy, Varela.
1. The Step Zero Debate
Throughout the relevant cases, the government has consistently
maintained that Chevron deference is applicable to USCIS's determination
of what constitutes an "immediate relative" under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 151(b)(2)(A)(i) for purposes of an 1-130 petition. Specifically, the
government has argued that Chevron is appropriate based upon Varela, the
precedential administrative decision that embodies its position.' 89 The
Supreme Court has determined that Chevron deference is generally
applicable to BIA interpretations of the statutes it administers. 190 To bolster
the merit of Varela, the government has also pointed to a regulation
promulgated in 2006 by the Secretary of Homeland Security and Attorney
General and published
after notice-and-comment that reconfirms the
19 1
holding in that case.
The rejected beneficiaries, on the other hand, have argued that the
Agency's interpretation is grounded on an "extra-jurisdictional and
discredited agency opinion," citing the decision in Sano.19 2 Their argument
hinges on the continuing vitality of Varela; that because the decision of the
93
BIA was nonprecedential, it is not entitled to full Chevron deference.'
The plaintiffs have emphasized that, at most, Varela is an informal agency
interpretation of a statute, and thus under United States v. Mead Corp. it

188. See supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part I.E. 1.
190. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999) (explaining that the BIA
should be accorded Chevron deference when it gives meaning to "ambiguous statutory
terms" through its authority in case-by-case adjudication).
191. See Final Opening Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 7, Lockhart v. Chertoff, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2008) (No. 08-3321) [hereinafter Lockhart,
Government's Final Opening Brief] ("There is no authority to approve a visa petition after
the petitioner dies." (citing 71 Fed. Reg. 35,732, 35,735 (June 21, 2006))).
192. Appellee's Final Brief at 21, Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 08-3321 (6th Cir. Aug. 5,
2008) [hereinafter Lockhart, Plaintiff's Final Brief]; see also Opposition to Respondents'
Motion to Dismiss at 9-10, Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2007) (No. 0710499) [hereinafter Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition to MTD] ("[T]he notion [argued by the
government] ... flows not from the 'good and sufficient cause' language of the statute, but
from a discredited decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals .... Varela,however, is not
good law."); Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 16-17
("Varela, however, is not good law.... [R]eview in that case was 'inappropriate."' (citing In
re Sano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 299, 300 (BIA 1985)).
193. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 22; Brief for the PlaintiffPetitioner-Appellee at 20, Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177 (No. 08-1179) [hereinafter Taing,
Plaintiffs Brief] (citing Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004);
Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 839 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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would not be entitled to Chevron deference. 194 Lastly, even assuming
arguendo that Varela is a legitimate and authoritative decision, the
plaintiffs have maintained that the opinion "fails to provide a 'full-blown
reasoned interpretation' of the statute" and therefore is not entitled to
deference. 95
The government has responded to these arguments by insisting that the
consequence of the Sano decision is not as extreme as the plaintiffs
asserted.' 96 According to the government, the BIA's ruling in Sano
modified Varela only to the extent that the beneficiary's lack of standing
would have been a more proper basis for the decision.' 97 However, Sano
did not abandon the holding in Varela that an alien was no longer a
"spouse," and therefore no longer an "immediate relative," once the
petitioning U.S. citizen spouse dies. 198 In fact, according to the
government, Sano establishes that a Form 1-130 case "cannot go forward
after the petitioner dies."' 19 9
The government has bolstered this contention by arguing that the position
taken in Varela was ratified by regulation in 2006, when DHS issued a final
rule titled "Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants." 200 The stated
purpose of this final rule-effective on July 21, 2006, after notice-andcomment-was to adopt an interim rule that had been published by the
former INS on October 20, 1997, and to clarify some of the issues raised
under it. 20 1 The specific portion of the immigration procedure being
regulated is the affidavit of support process; this includes "who needs an
affidavit of support, how sponsors qualify, what information and
194. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 22; Taing, Plaintiff's Brief,
supra note 193, at 20-21 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1168 n.6
(9th Cir. 2004)).
195. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 22-23 (quoting Singh v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief in
Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 18; Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 169, at 2728 (quoting Singh, 383 F.3d at 152).
196. See Final Reply Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 11, Lockhart, No. 08-3321 (6th
Cir. Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief].
197. Respondents' Reply Brief in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5,
Robinson v. Chertoff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34956 (D.J.N.Y May 14, 2007) (No. 06-5702)
[hereinafter Robinson, Government's Reply Brief in Further Support of MTD] (noting that
the assertion of Sano being about the Board's jurisdiction to act on a case, and not the
beneficiary's standing, is a meaningless distinction).
198. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 12 (citing In re Sano,
19 1. & N. Dec. 299, 300-01 (1985)); Opening Brief for Respondents-Defendants-Appellants
at 24-25, Taing v. Chertoff, No. 08-1179 (1st Cir. May 9, 2008) [hereinafter Taing,
Government's Opening Brief]; see also Robinson, Government's Reply Brief in Further
Support of MTD, supra note 197, at 6 n.3 ("Sano merely found that the Board's decision to
review the Varela case was inappropriate, not that the ultimate conclusion was erroneous.").
199. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief in Further Support of MTD, supra note 197, at
6.
200. 71 Fed. Reg. 35,732 (June 21, 2006) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 204, 205, 213a, 299
(2008)).
201. Id.
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documentation they must present, and when the income of other persons
may be used to support an intending immigrant's application for permanent
residence." 20 2 The government has expressly pointed to portion G, titled
"The Effect of the Visa Petitioner's Death," which states, "There is no
authority to approve a visa petition after the petitioner dies ....

If the

petitioner dies before approval of the visa petition, there is no basis for
approving the visa petition." 203 The specific class of future 1-130
applications discussed in this Note is not under the authority of these
regulations. Rather, this rule amended 8 C.F.R. § 205.1, and thus had an
effect on the regulation governing the revocation of approved petitions or
self-petitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1154. Nonetheless, the articulation of the
Agency's interpretation followed by formal regulation, according to the
20 4
government, merits Chevron deference.
Furthermore, the government has responded to the plaintiffs' assertion
that Chevron deference is inappropriate because Varela did not provide
sufficient analysis. It has stated that there was no "actual lack of analysis"
in Varela "because the plain meaning of the statute plainly required the
result." 2 05
2. The Step Zero Conflict: Where the Courts Stand
Most of the relevant court decisions do not go into an analysis of whether
the Agency decision in Varela even qualifies for Chevron deference. If
such analysis is mentioned, it is muddled with the analysis under the two
prongs of Chevron.2 0 6 However, a consistent disagreement regarding this
issue nevertheless exists. The cases that have followed Freeman have all
found that Varela warrants weak, if any, Chevron deference. 20 7 On the
other hand, the three cases supporting USCIS's construction of the statuteBurger, Turek, and Robinson-have found the applicability of Chevron
20 8
deference to the decision in Varela warranted.
In Freeman, the court conducted an initial inquiry as to whether, and to
what extent, Chevron deference was owed. 20 9 The court was "mindful" that
its answer for which reading of the statute was correct "implicate[d] an
agency's construction of a statute which it administers." 2 10 If this was not
the case, then there would be a clear exception to Chevron applicability as
202. Id.
203. Id. at 35,735.
204. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 13 (citing Nat'l Cable

& Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)).
205. Id. at 13 n.5.
206. See, e.g., Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
defendants were not entitled to deference under Chevron, but only because their construction
of the statute was impermissible, not because Varela did not qualify under Chevron).
207. See infra note 215.
208. See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
209. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1038.
210. Id. (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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discussed in Part 1.211 However, at no point did any of the plaintiffs argue,
nor did a court find, that Chevron deference was not owed because the
Agency was interpreting a statute it was not responsible for
administering. 2 12 Therefore, the court went on to consider the decision in
Varela.
Although the Freeman opinion did not explicitly state that Chevron
deference for Varela was absolutely inapplicable, it severely weakened any
such deference. The court found that in Varela, there was a lack of
statutory analysis, and that the opinion's weight was "further undercut by
the BIA's later finding that it was 'extra-jurisdictional.' ' 213 The court
expressed that it was "cautioned" against awarding significant deference to
the BIA's conclusion in Varela.2 14 The courts in Taing and Lockhart
concurred with the Ninth Circuit regarding
the precedential value of Varela
2 15
explanation.
further
much
without
The Burger and Turek courts both held that the Agency's interpretation
established in Varela was sufficient to warrant the applicability of Chevron
deference. In Burger, the court stated that, "[i]n light of the deference owed
to the BIA's interpretation of statutory law[,] . . . it cannot be said that this
is an impermissible construction of the statute." 2 16 However, it is important
to note that the Burger court merely deferred to the BIA's interpretation in
Varela, without even mentioning the Board's subsequent decision in Sano.
The plaintiff in Robinson called into question "whether the court was even
2 17
aware of the ruling."
The Turek court similarly found "persuasive that the BIA had previously
determined that the beneficiary of a spousal immediate relative petition
would be ineligible for that status if the petitioning spouse dies before the
statutory two-year time period. ' 218 However, similarly to Burger, the court
did not analyze the applicability of Chevron deference or make any
reference to the decision in Sano.
211. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182 (D. Mass. 2007) (recognizing
Chevron's applicability when a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute that it
administers).
213. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1038 (citing In re Sano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 299 (BIA 1985)).
214. Id. at 1038 n.10 ("We have also indicated that nonprecedential BIA decisions might
receive less deference than those designated as precedential." (quoting Lagandaon v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
215. Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *31 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 7, 2008) ("Turek and Burger improperly apply Chevron deference ...[and] thus
grossly over-emphasize the precedential value of In re Varela."); Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d at
183 ("This Court agrees [with Freeman]. The court owes no deference to Matter of Varela
beyond its persuasive power.").
216. Burger v. McElroy, No. 97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999).
217. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 169, at 24 n.2. As mentioned in Part I, supra
note 169 and accompanying text, the brief also emphasized the fact that Burger is an
unpublished lower court opinion that predates Freeman and "does not even address, much
less analyze, § 1151(b)(l)(A)(i)." Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 24.
218. Turek v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 450 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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The most recent court to rule in favor of USCIS, the Third Circuit in
Robinson, did not even mention Chevron.2 19 At no point in the majority's
opinion did it discuss the validity of Varela, nor did it discuss Chevron
deference.2 20 The opinion merely mentioned the government's argument
that the court should defer to BIA precedent established in Varela, but
22
never fully addressed the issue.
B. Step One: If Chevron Applies, Has Congress Spoken?
Even if one takes the position that the Chevron framework applies to the
policy established by Varela, it is still necessary to consider whether there
should be Chevron deference through an analysis of Steps One and Two.
This section discusses the arguments surrounding the first prong of
Chevron: whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise question at
issue. As discussed in Part I, if congressional intent is clear, then the court
and agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. 222 However, if Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue and the statute is silent or ambiguous, then the court
223
should move on to analyze the second prong of Chevron.
In order to ascertain congressional intent, this Note explores three distinct
yet related areas of the U.S. immigration system. Part II.B.1 concentrates
on the statute itself, particularly on 8 U.S.C. § 1151's language and
structure. The next subsection deals with two other statutes, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1154 and 1155-as well as other related regulations-which involve the
adjustment of status regime as a whole and thus may shed light on
Congress's intentions in enacting § 1151. Part II.B.3 briefly explores the
USA PATRIOT Act and National Defense Authorization Act, which have
also been cited by the government as relevant to congressional intent.
1. Statutory Language and Structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1151
a. The Linguistic Debate: What the PartiesHave Argued
Opposing sides throughout the relevant cases have sought to utilize the
language and structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) to demonstrate that
Congress has spoken to this issue. Thus, both parties have attempted to use
the same statute, but have construed it differently, in order to support their
posited theory. As the Freeman court stated, "'The starting point for our
224
interpretation of a statute is always its language."'
219. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946 (3d Cir. Feb. 2,

2009).
220. See id.
221. Id. at *8.
222. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
224. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)).
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The main thrust of the plaintiffs' statutory construction argument is that
the first and second sentences of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) refer to two separate
immigration processes, or alternatively, that the statute provides for two
different classes of immediate relatives. 22 5
The first sentence of
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) states, "For purposes of this subsection, the term
'immediate relatives' means the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen
of the United States, except that, in the case of parents, such citizens shall
be at least 21 years of age." 226 Thus, it defines "immediate relative[s]" as
"children, spouses, and parents" of U.S. citizens. 227 The plaintiffs claim
that the definition of "immediate relative" is absolutely unequivocal, and
"under a plain reading" would include the plaintiffs in these cases. 228 The
second sentence of § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) states,
In the case of an alien who was the spouse of a citizen of the United
States for at least 2 years at the time of the citizen's death and was not
legally separated from the citizen at the time of the citizen's death, the
alien ... shall be considered, for purposes of this subsection, to remain an
immediate relative after the date of the citizen's death but only if the
spouse files a petition under section 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) of this title229
within 2
years after such date and only until the date the spouse remarries.
According to the plaintiffs, this sentence provides a separate and additional
right under 8 U.S.C. § 1 154(a)(1)(A)(ii) for alien widows to self-petition for
immediate relative classification in the event that their citizen spouse dies
without filing an 1-130 petition. 230 Thus, the second sentence does not
narrow the scope of the phrase "immediate relative" in the first sentence,
but rather broadens it.2 31 It is an independent safeguard created by
Congress for widows whose spouses died without filing petitions on their
behalf. 232 However, the plaintiffs have urged that the second sentence is
inapplicable to their cases, because congressional intent is clear that they
qualify "as a 'first sentence' spouse, not a 'second sentence' spouse/self233
petitioning widow."
The government has replied to this proposed statutory dichotomy by
asserting that 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) requires a foreign national, who
is the surviving spouse of a U.S. citizen, to have been married for two years
before the U.S. citizen spouse's death in order to classify as an "immediate

225. See Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 6.
226. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
See Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 10.
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2007); 8 U.S.C.

§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that "[a]n alien spouse described in the second sentence of
section 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) of this title also may file a petition").
231. Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 184.
232. See Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 20.

233. Id. at 21.
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relative," regardless of whether an application is pending. 234 However, the
plaintiffs have defended their stance by positing that this is an incorrect
interpretation of the statute that "flies in the face of logic and is in
opposition to USCIS procedural interpretations and requirements." 235 They
have maintained that "[t]he second sentence of the statute [only] applies to
those foreign national spouses whose U.S. citizen spouse dies withoutfiling
an 1-130 petition on behalf of his[/her] foreign national [spouse].

'236

The

plaintiffs have pointed to the fact that alien spouses who qualify under the
second sentence are processed under a different procedure than those
included in the first sentence. 237 Thus, the second category of immediate
23 8
relatives does not alter the first.

Moreover, the plaintiffs have urged that "[t]he princip[al] rule of
statutory interpretation requires that one presumes that Congress says in the
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." 2 39 The
plaintiffs have pointed out that there is no explicit wording in the Act that
voids 1-130 petitions filed by a beneficiary in the event of that individual's
death. 240 "It is a fundamental can[on] of statutory construction that where
sections of a statute do not include a specific term used elsewhere in the
statute, the drafters did not wish such a requirement to apply." 24 1 The
plaintiffs have reasoned that if "Congress intended to divest immigration
officials of their authority to adjudicate 1-130 petitions for a particular class
of individuals.., it would have explicitly done so." 242 Furthermore, within
§ 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i), the only "qualifier limitation" applies to alien parents
(restricting "immediate relative" status to parents of a citizen child who is at
least 21 years
of age). 243 However, there is no analogous qualifier to be a
"spouse," 244 and where a statute has a qualifier in one part, but is silent or
has no qualifier in another, there is a duty to refrain from importing that

234. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *7 (3d Cir.
Feb. 2, 2009); Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
235. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 12; Taing, Plaintiffs Brief,
supra note 193, at 11.
236. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 12; Taing, Plaintiffs Brief,
supra note 193, at II.
237. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(1), 204.2(b) (2008) (self-petition 1-360 process); cf 8
C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(l), 204.2(a) (citizen spouse/I-130 petition process).
238. See Taing, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 193, at 12.
239. Lockhart, Plaintiff's Final Brief, supra note 192, at 10-11 (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)).
240. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 20.
241. Id. at 24 (quoting Alaska v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 97-98 (3d Cir.

2006)).
242. Id.
243. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 10; Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief,
supra note 169, at 6.
244. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *7 (3d Cir.
Feb. 2, 2009).
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qualifying language into a part of a statute that Congress has expressly
24 5
omitted.
The government has refuted this allegation by requesting that the courts
look to the words expressly included in the statute, such as "spouse" and
"for purposes of this subsection," and to "give them their intended plain
meaning and effect. ' 24 6 It has consistently argued that the statute clearly
contemplates that the death of the petitioner while the petition is pending
requires the denial of an 1-130 petition.247 There are several facets to the
government's statutory argument.
First, the government takes issue with the plaintiffs trying to "divorce"
the first and second sentences of the provision 248 and relying on a "forced
reading" of 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 249 Instead, the government has
contended that, because the second sentence specifically delineates a
defined group to remain immediate relatives after the death of the
petitioning U.S. citizen, the implication is that outside of this group,
immediate relative status (including "spouse") terminates with the citizen's
death. 250 Furthermore, if Congress intended a surviving spouse to be
included as an immediate relative within the first sentence, it would have
2 51
explicitly stated so.

The next facet of the argument involves the use of the phrase "for
purposes of this subsection" at the beginning of the relevant statute.
According to the government, this phrase signifies an intent for the first and
second sentences to be read together as an unfragmented whole. 252 Thus,
the phrase is an "explicit directive" that the words in each sentence should
be understood to effect the entirety of section 1151(b), including the first
sentence. 253 "Congress ordinarily adheres to a hierarchical scheme in
subdividing statutory sections," 254 and the government has pointed to this

245. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 10 (citing Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)).
246. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 3-4.
247. Id. at 5.
248. Amended Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 12, Robinson v. Napolitano, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1946 (3rd Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) (No. 07-2977) [hereinafter Robinson,
Government's Amended Brief]; Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196,
at 2.
249. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 3, Robinson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946
(No. 07-2977) [hereinafter Robinson, Government's Reply Brief].
250. Robinson, Government's Amended Brief, supra note 248, at 12; Robinson,
Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249; Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief,
supra note 196, at 3.
251. Lockhart, Government's Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 17.
252. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 3; see also Taing v.
Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184-85 (D. Mass. 2007).
253. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 3; see also Robinson,
Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 3-4.
254. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 6, Taing v.
Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2007) (No. 07-10499) [hereinafter Taing,
Government's Memorandum of Law] (quoting Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., v. Nigh,
543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004)).
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hierarchical scheme laid down in drafting manuals generated by the
legislative counsels' offices in the House of Representatives and the
Senate. 255 The House manual, which is practically identical to the Senate's,
provides, "To the maximum extent practicable, a section should be broken
into-(A) subsections (starting with (a)); (B) paragraphs (starting with (1));
' '2 5
6
(C) subparagraphs (starting with (A)); (D) clauses (starting with (i)).
Therefore, according to the government, the language "for purposes of this
subsection" applies to the whole of the statute, particularly to the first
sentence of § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i), and "cannot be cabined as a stand-alone
sentence within that provision. 2 5 7 The plaintiffs' response has been a
refutation of any notion that the drafting manual helps to establish that the
second sentence modifies the first sentence rather than to provide an
additional and distinct right. 258 According to the plaintiffs, the government
can offer no explanation of how the order of sentences in a subsection or
259
clause makes them related.
The government has further contended that if the plaintiffs' interpretation
was correct that the two-year marriage requirement applies only to selfpetitioners, then that material would be more appropriate in a different
portion of the INA. 260 It has been maintained that it would be "more
natural" to place that requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii), the
statutory section that creates the procedure for self-petitioning. 26
Thus, the government's argument can be summarized as such: the
second sentence is the rule that determines whether an alien can qualify as
an "immediate relative" after the death of his/her spouse. 262 If he or she
was married for less than two years when the citizen dies, it is clear that the
263
plaintiff does not qualify.

However, the plaintiffs have deemed the government's assertions
"baseless" 264 and urged the courts to reject the government's attempt to
read the second sentence of the statute as "implicitly importing a two-year
requirement into the definition of spouse. '265 According to the plaintiffs,
either the citizen's spouse files the petition, or if he/she dies without doing
so, the alien may self-petition as long as the marriage lasted at least two
years. 266
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, HLC Doc. No. 104-1, at 24 (1995)).
257. Taing, Government's Memorandum of Law, supra note 254, at 7.
258. Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 16-17.
259. Id. at 16.
260. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 4; Lockhart, Government's
Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 5.
261. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 4.
262. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 16; Lockhart, Government's
Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 18.
263. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 16; Lockhart, Government's
Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 19.
264. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 7.
265. Id. at 20 (quoting Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2006)).
266. Id. at 7.
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b. The Linguistic Debate: Where the Courts Stand
In response to the statutory language and structure arguments made by
the plaintiffs and the government, the courts have come out on two different
sides, consistent with the larger circuit split. The Freeman court found
"that Congress clearly intended an alien widow whose citizen spouse has
filed the necessary forms to be and to remain an immediate relative
(spouse) for purposes of § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i), even if the citizen spouse dies
within two years of the marriage." 267 Thus, the court ruled that the more
logical and statutorily substantiated interpretation is that the two-year
durational language in the second sentence of the statute merely grants a
separate right for an alien widow to self-petition. 268 The court wrote that
the first sentence is "straightforward and succinct," and that the word
spouse, unlike alien "parents," does not contain a qualifier requiring a twoyear marriage requirement. 269 Instead, "immediate relative" means a
spouse of a citizen of the United States, without exception. 2 70 The court
viewed the government's attempt to read the second sentence as implicitly
importing a two-year requirement into the definition of spouse as an
"untenable interpretation." 27 1 Relevant to this conclusion was the
"'grammatical structure of [the] statute"' that suggested "that the second
sentence 'stands independent' of the first and does not qualify the general
definition of spouse. 272 The court recognized that this interpretation
"harmonizes and is consistent with the language and structure of the
statute" urged by the plaintiffs. 273 Additionally, the court refused to
significance" of a "two-year anniversary" in the
recognize any "talismanic
2 74
immigration context.
The two cases adhering to the conclusion in Freeman, Taing, and
Lockhart, similarly found that congressional intent was clear based upon the
language of the statute. In Taing, the court looked at the structure of the
statute, and agreed with both the plaintiff and the court in Freeman that the
second sentence's two-year limitation applies only when a "citizen spouse
dies before initiating an adjustment of status proceedings on behalf of his

267. Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1041.
272. Id. at 1041 n.14 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42
(1989)).
273. Id. at 1042. The court also discussed the framework laid out by 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1

and 204.2 and found that it supported this conclusion. Id. at 1041-42. Specifically, the court
stated that the distinction between the rights of a citizen spouse to petition compared to the
rights of an alien widow to self-petition within the regulations "is consistent with a
congressional intent to create two different processes, such that one or the other applieseither the citizen spouse petitions or, if he dies without doing so, the alien widow may do
so."Id. at 1042.
274. Id. at 1041 n.13.
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alien spouse." 275 In the most recent decision to rule against the
government, the Lockhart court based its decision on the "well-reasoned
opinions of the Ninth Circuit (Freeman), Massachusetts District Court
(Taing) and New Jersey District Court (Robinson)," in holding that "an
alien-spouse whose citizen-spouse dies after properly filing a Form 1-130
petition on behalf of an alien-spouse is entitled to 'immediate relative'
status under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). ''276 The court simply pointed to
the other decisions in support of its finding without ample discussion of the
statutory language.
On the other hand, the three cases to rule in favor of the government have
found congressional intent clearly inapposite. The earlier opinions of
Burger and Turek do not include substantial statutory analysis but merely
conclusory statements. For example, according to the court's opinion in
Turek, the statute unambiguously states that "'immediate relative' status is
reserved for an alien who is the spouse of a citizen of the United States 'for
at least 2 years at the time of the citizen's death."'' 277 That is the entirety of
the court's analysis on this point.
However, the Robinson court devoted a substantial part of its opinion to
the structure of the statute, and delved into a detailed analysis of the
linguistic debate. The Third Circuit found the underlying statutory
construction to be '279
uncomplicated, 278 for the language and interpretation was
"straightforward.
It decided that the first sentence of the statute could
not be divorced from the second, and therefore the second sentence
qualified the definition of spouse "by including as an immediate relative the
widow or widower of a citizen spouse who died as long as s/he had been the
spouse of the United States citizen for at least two years at the time of the
citizen spouse's death. '280 The court did not view the statute as laying out
two distinct tracks with only one requiring a two-year marriage
requirement. Rather, the court found the durational condition applied
regardless of whether the citizen spouse filed the petition prior to his/her
death. 28 1 Thus, it concluded that "the second sentence qualifies which
'2 82
spouses of deceased citizens are immediate relatives.
275. Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 186 (D. Mass. 2007) (quoting Freeman, 444
F.3d at 1042). In Taing v. Chertoff the court also found further support for its interpretation
in the second paragraph of 8 U.S.C. § 1154, allowing an alien spouse described in the second
sentence of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) to petition. Id. According to the court, this section clearly
displays Congress's intention to provide a separate, additional right to alien spouses to selfpetition if their citizen spouse died without initiating the immigrant proceeding. Id.
276. Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *30-31 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 7, 2008).
277. Turek v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 450 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006)).
278. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *14 (3d Cir.
Feb. 2, 2009).
279. Id. at *16.
280. Id. at*15.
281. Id. at *16.
282. Id. at *17.

1906

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

2. Adjustment of Status Regime: Other Related Immigration Statutes and
Regulations
Another method for ascertaining congressional intent is to look not just to
the words contained in the statute, but rather to also look at the broader
statutory scheme governing immigrant petitions and adjustment of status
applications. Through an investigation of the latter, light may be shed on
whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue in 8 U.S.C. §
1151, and thus assists in a determination of Chevron Step One. It is
especially important to explore other provisions of the INA, because "[i]n
understanding and applying a regulatory scheme, [the court] should
interpret statutes to be coherent and internally consistent. '283 Within this
section, this Note discusses two statutory provisions that deal specifically
with the matter in controversy-8 U.S.C. § 1154 and 8 U.S.C. § 1155-as
well as several other INA implementing regulations.
a. 8 U.S.C. § 1154: Present Tense and Investigation
A further contention between the parties, explicitly established in their
case briefs, involves 8 U.S.C. § 1154-the section concerning the
procedure for granting immigrant status. According to part (b) of the
statute, as discussed in Part I, the Attorney General (now the Secretary of
Homeland Security) must conduct an investigation in every Form 1-130
immigrant visa petition case. 28 4

USCIS may not approve a Form 1-130

petition on behalf of a claimed immediate relative unless it finds, as a result
of this investigation, "that the facts stated in the petition are true and that
the alien on behalf of whom the petition is made is an immediate
relative." 2 85 The government has steadfastly relied on the present tense in
the statute to argue that Congress authorized the approval of a visa petition
only if, at the time of the investigation, the facts are true and the alien is an
immediate relative. 28 6 Therefore, the government maintains that the facts
stated in the late spouses' petitions are not true and that the plaintiffs are not
immediate relatives. 2 87 Rather, if this was not Congress's intention, then

283. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); Mutschler v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of
Wash., 607 F.2d 274, 276 (9th Cir. 1979)).
284. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (2006) (requiring the Attorney General to investigate the facts of
each case, and directing that "if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are true,"
he "shall" approve the immediate relative petition); see supra notes 46-47 and

accompanying text.
285. Respondents' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) at 3, Robinson v. Chertoff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34956 (D.N.J. May
14, 2007) (No. 06-5702) [hereinafter Robinson, Government's Brief in Support of MTD]

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b)).
286. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 5-6.
287. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 5 ("[T]he use of the present
tense in the context of the investigation of the visa petition is meaningful."); Robinson,
Government's Brief in Support of MTD, supra note 285, at 5; see United States v. Wilson,
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the government contends Congress could have "easily... written this
statutory section to mandate approval if the facts were true at the time the
application was filed and/or if the alien was an immediate relative at the
time the application was filed.

'2 88

The argument concludes that USCIS had

no authority to approve the 1-130 petition after the petitioner's death and
accordingly acted pursuant to law in terminating action on it.2 89 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(b) "supports the interpretation that Congress did not provide for a
'once an immediate relative, always an immediate relative' approach. '290
The government's assertion is further buttressed by the impossibility of
an investigation following the death of a petitioner. A Form 1-130 petition
may not be approved based upon a marriage that was entered into solely to
obtain an immigration benefit. 29' The petitioner's death could preclude the
government from conducting a complete investigation of this issue, because
it is obviously impossible to interview the petitioner under oath regarding
his or her marriage to the beneficiary. 292 Therefore, the government has
argued that its construction of the statute "is consistent with Congress'[s]
293
concern with identifying and discouraging marriage fraud."
The response to the present tense argument made by the government is
that it is "absurd" and "yields results unintended by Congress. '294 The
plaintiffs have argued that the government's stance fails to recognize the
distinction between an alien's eligibility for immediate relative
classification, which "vests at the time of filing, '295 and one's admissibility
296
as an immigrant, which is determined at the time of adjudication.
According to the plaintiffs, it is clear from various statutory provisions and
regulations, in addition to relevant cases, that Congress intended a
beneficiary's eligibility for immediate relative classification to be
determined at the time of filing. 297 In contrast, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, an
503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) ("Congress'[s] use of a verb tense is significant in construing
statutes.").
288. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 6; Lockhart, Government's

Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 8.
289. Robinson, Government's Brief in Support of MTD, supra note 285, at 11.
290. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 7.
291. See Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1953); In re Laureano, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
292. Robinson, Government's Brief in Support of MTD, supra note 285, at 7.
293. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 32.
294. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 15.
295. Taing, Plaintiffs Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 2; Robinson, Plaintiff's
Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 6.
296. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 169, at 16-17; see also Robinson v.
Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *10 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009)
("Robinson argues that ...her status as an immediate relative ... 'vested' at the time her
husband filed the 1-130 petition.").
297. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 169, at 18 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§
l154(a)(1)(A)(i), 1255(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(12), 204.1(a)(1), 204.2(a)(1),
245.1 (a), 245.1 (g)(1), 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B) (2008)); see also In re Katigbak, 14 I. & N. Dec. 45,
49 (Reg. Comm. 1971) (finding that Congress intended eligibility for employment-based
immigrant classification to be established at the time of filing a visa petition). It is
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applicant's admissibility as an immigrant for adjustment of status is
determined at the time of adjudication. 298 The plaintiffs have
argued that
299
the government's analysis disregards this crucial distinction.
To further prove their position, the plaintiffs have pointed to specific
clauses within various other statutes and regulations.
For example,
§ 1255(a)(3) requires only that an immigrant visa be available to the
applicant at the time the application is filed.300 The same language appears
in the regulations concerning adjustment of status, i.e. "unless an immigrant
visa is immediately available to him or her at the time the application is
filed."'30 1 Additionally, similar provisions mentioning the time of filing
appear in the regulations governing the processing of immigrant
petitions. 30 2 The plaintiffs have argued that all these statutes and
regulations support the position that they remain eligible for adjustment of
status because an immigrant visa was immediately available and their
eligibility was established at the time their citizen spouse filed the Form I130 petition, regardless of subsequent events. 30 3 Conversely, the plaintiffs
have argued that these regulations provide no foundation for presuming that
304
their spousal status somehow dissolved after filing.
However, the government has rebutted this by claiming that "to initiate a
process is not to complete it."' 30 5 The government has stressed that
filing/applying and adjudicating are two separate stages in the
administrative process and, therefore, a regulation pertaining to one is not
relevant to one pertaining to the other. 30 6 Thus, according to the
government, immediate relative status is determined
at the time the 1-130
30 7
petition is adjudicated, not at the time it was filed.

As for the Agency investigation issue, the corresponding response by the
plaintiffs has been that "[riespondents ...make a fatal assumption about

the authority, and ability, of the government to conduct the required
undisputed that the plaintiffs did qualify as immediate relative "spouses" at the time of
filing. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supranote 169, at 7.
298. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 19 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a),
1255(a); In re Alarcon, 20 I. & N. Dec. 557 (BIA 1992); In re 0--, 8 I. & N. Dec. 295 (BIA
1959)).
299. Id.
300. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(3).
301. 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(g)(1); see also id. § 245.2(a)(2)(B) (similarly specifying "at the
time of filing").
302. See, e.g., id § 204.1 (stating that a citizen or LPR who petitions for a qualifying
relative's classification must file a Form 1-130 petition); id. § 204.2(a)(1) ("A United States
citizen or alien admitted for lawful permanent residence may file a petition on behalf of a
spouse.").
303. Taing, Plaintiffs Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 7; Robinson, Plaintiffs
Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 11-12; Robinson, Plaintiff s Brief, supra note
169, at 9-10.
304. Taing, Plaintiff s Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 3.
305. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 8.
306. Id.
307. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *11 (3d Cir.
Feb. 2, 2009).
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investigation following the death of the petitioning spouse." 30 8 The
plaintiffs have acknowledged that the purpose of an investigation is to
discover marriages that are legally valid, but were entered into solely to
obtain an immigration benefit. 30 9 However, the plaintiffs have also pointed
out that 1-130 petitions are routinely approved if the petition is filed on
behalf of an alien spouse who is not physically located in the United
States. 3 10 In other words, in the context of 1-130 petitions filed at regional
offices for the purpose of immigrant visa processing (consular processing),
immigration officials always approve 1-130 petitions without interviewing
the petitioning spouse. 3 11 Instead, these petitions are routinely adjudicated
solely on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted. 3 12 Thus, it
"defies logic" for the government to insist that it cannot determine the bona
fides of a relationship without interviewing the petitioning spouse when it
does so in the context of immigrant visa applications. 3 13 Therefore, the
plaintiffs have emphasized that immigration officials do have the authority
to conduct an investigation without interviewing the 1-130 petitioner,
whether the citizen spouse is alive or deceased. 314 Another gap in the
government's argument, stressed in the plaintiffs' briefs, is that even where
the Agency does interview the petitioning spouse prior to the citizen's
death, but has not yet adjudicated the 1-130 petition, the Agency still takes
the position that it cannot approve the petition because of the impossibility
of determining the bona fides of the marriage. 315 The plaintiffs have
claimed that this point "illustrates the disingenuous nature of the
'3 16
government's marriage fraud-justification.
The government insists that this argument is illogical because USCIS
may conduct the investigation in a number of ways within its discretion,
including documentary evidence, affidavits, and/or by interviewing the
petitioner and his/her spouse. 3 17 Thus, USCIS's discretion to conduct inperson interviews in other contexts does not undermine the fact that to do so
3 18
would be impossible within the facts of these cases.

308. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 9.
309. Id.at 9-10.
310. Id. at 10.
311. Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 4-5.
312. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 33 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(0,
204.2(a)(1)(i)(B)(1)-(6), 204.2(a)(2) (2008)).
313. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 10-11;
Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 33.
314. Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 5; Robinson, Plaintiff's
Brief, supra note 169, at 34.
315. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 169, at 34.
316. Id.
317. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief in Further Support of MTD, supra note 197, at
5.
318. Id.
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b. Give and Take: 8 U.S.C. § 1155-Revocation and Humanitarian
Discretion
The last argument made by the government under the adjustment of
status regime involves the authority to revoke immigrant visa petitions. As
discussed in Part I, 8 U.S.C. § 1155 permits the Secretary of Homeland
Security to revoke approval of an immigrant visa petition at any time for
what the Secretary deems "good and sufficient cause. ' 319 Through
regulation, the Secretary has established that a petitioner's death
automatically revokes approval of a visa petition. 320 An immigrant visa
petitioner's death has been "good and sufficient cause" for revocation since
at least 1938.321 Although there is an opportunity for the Secretary to
reinstate predeath approval through humanitarian discretion, 322 this
authority does not apply if the petitioner dies while the Form 1-130 is
323
pending (postdeath approval).
The logic of the government proceeds as such: if the visa petitioner's
death is a sufficient basis to revoke a petition after it is approved, it should
324
also be a sufficient basis to deny a petition before it is approved.
Although the government concedes that § 1151 does not expressly
authorize the denial of an unapproved visa petition, the Secretary has used
the statute to demonstrate that Congress manifestly intended alien widows
to be ineligible as "immediate relatives. '3 25 To strengthen this argument,
the government has pointed to a "settled administrative rule" that once a
visa petition is approved, it can only be revoked for a reason sufficient to
3 26
also warrant denial of the petition.
The plaintiffs have characterized the distinction between predeath
approval and postdeath approval as "arbitrary and irrational. '327 They
argue that there is "no rational basis" to grant benefits to a surviving spouse
who was lucky enough to have his/her 1-130 petition processed before
his/her spouse's death, while punishing another surviving spouse who was
"less fortunate." 328 Additionally, they have pointed out that § 1155 does
not apply in their cases because the government's revocation authority

319. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
321. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 14 (citing 8 C.F.R. §

205.2 (1938)).
322. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
323. Dodig v. INS, 9 F.3d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1993).
324. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 19; Lockhart, Government's
Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 21.
325. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 14-15.
326. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 19 (citing In re Estime, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 450, 451 (BIA 1987)); Lockhart, Government's Final Opening Brief, supra note
191, at 21 (citing same).
327. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 15.
328. Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 9 n.4.
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concerns only approved (as opposed to unadjudicated) petitions. 329 In their
cases, their 1-130 petitions were not approved and therefore cannot be
330
revoked.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have claimed that the Agency's regulations
regarding its revocation authority is ultra vires, going beyond the power of
the statute. 33 1 First, the statute itself does not contemplate revocation of a
'33 2
properly filed and approved petition as "good and sufficient cause.
Second, the idea that the death of a petitioner can be considered "good and
sufficient cause" to automatically revoke an approved petition or to
terminate action on an adjudicated petition "runs contrary to fundamental
justice and due process of law," particularly in light of the fact that the
government will routinely approve 1-130 petitions without interviewing the
333
citizen spouse.
c. The Step One Debate Continues: Where the Courts Stand
Although the arguments surrounding §§ 1154 and 1155 are pervasive in
the plaintiffs' and government's briefs, the actual court decisions were
sparse in their discussion of the relevant issues. In fact, the Robinson
opinion was the only one to discuss the language "at the time of filing" 334 in
other statutory and regulatory provisions, and
no court analyzed the
335
humanitarian discretion and revocation matter.
In Freeman, the court found that the structure of the adjustment of status
regime supported the plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute. 336 The court
discussed how the government was unable to point to anything in the
procedure that would suggest that properly filed forms are "entirely voided
upon the citizen petitioner's death. '337 However, the Freeman court did not
specifically consider the present tense or investigation arguments. In
329. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 26; Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition
to MTD, supra note 192, at 8; Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at II n.1.
330. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 26; Taing, Plaintiffs Brief,
supra note 193, at 25.
331. Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 7.
332. Id. at 7 n.3; Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at I1 n.1.
333. Taing, Plaintiffs Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 7-8 n.3; Robinson,
Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 169, at 11 n.1 (also arguing that this practice "runs contrary to
fundamental notions ofjustice and due process of law").
334. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *12-14 (3d
Cir. Feb. 2, 2009).
335. The court in Burger explicitly avoided the issue of revocation, finding 8 C.F.R. §
205.1(a)(3) and the exercise of humanitarian discretion inapplicable to the circumstances of
the case. Burger v. McElroy, No. 97-Civ-8875, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999). However, the dissent in Robinson articulated a strong opposition
to the government's use of revocation to bolster their position. See Robinson, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1946, at *33-37 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
336. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Neither the definition
of immediate relative nor the text and structure of the adjustment of status regime provides
support for the government's position that Mrs. Freeman should be stripped of her spousal
status.").
337. Id.
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Lockhart, the court did not explicitly discuss investigation but did
specifically mention that in the facts of the case, USCIS had interviewed the
deceased spouse and "thus had an opportunity to question him regarding the
validity of his marriage to Ms. Lockhart. ' 338 The Taing and Turek courts
did not delve into any analysis of the present tense in § 1154 nor the
revocation issue in § 1155.
The only two cases to analyze the present tense arguments were
Robinson and Burger. The Robinson court rejected the lower court's
conclusion that the statute being written in the present tense was "not
particularly significant. '3 39 The court found that the use of present tense in
the statute "belie[d]" Robinson's position that eligibility for immediate
relative status is determined at the time of filing and instead demonstrated
that
the facts in the petition must be true at the time USCIS adjudicates
it. 340 Furthermore, the Robinson court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to
utilize other regulations containing the language "at the time of filing."'34 1
The regulations, according to the court, do not42suggest USCIS must only
3
consider facts at the time the petition was filed.
On the same side of the circuit split, the Burger court concluded that the
there was no authority under existing statutory or regulatory law for the
approval of the immediate relative petitions. 343 Moreover, the court
acknowledged that § 1154(b) was in the present tense, and thus affirmed
BIA's requirement that "the immediate family relation exist at the time the
'344
petition is adjudicated.
3. Other Relevant Statutes: The USA PATRIOT Act and National Defense
Authorization Act
Beyond the INA regulatory scheme discussed thus far, the government
has also cited to two independent statutes as evidence of the congressional
intent underlying 8 U.S.C. § 1151. Similar to the arguments laid out in Part
II.B.2(a), which compared 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154 and 1155 with § 1151, the
government has utilized the acts discussed below to demonstrate that
Congress has spoken on the precise question at issue, as Chevron Step One
requires.
The basis of the government's argument regarding clear congressional
intent supporting USCIS's interpretation is the notion that, "when Congress
has wanted to allow for an individual to immigrate based on his/her former
338. Lockhart v. Chertoff, No. 1:07CV823, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 889, at *32 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 7, 2008).
339. Robinson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *11 (quoting Robinson v. Chertoff, No.
06-5702, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34956, at *12 (D.N.J. May 14, 2007)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
340. Id. at *11-12.
341. Id. at*12-15.
342. Id. at * 13.
343. Burger v. McElroy, No. 97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4854, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999).
344. Id. at *17.
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marriage to an individual who is now dead, Congress has done so
clearly." 345 In support of this proposition, the government has pointed to
the similarities between the second sentence of § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) and two
other statutes: the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004,346 extending immigration eligibility to alien spouses of U.S. citizen
military personnel who died as a result of combat, and the USA PATRIOT
Act, 34 7 extending immigration eligibility to alien spouses of U.S. citizens
348
killed as a result of terrorist activity.
The government has cited to a specific provision of the USA PATRIOT
Act, § 421,349 to further support its idea of congressional intent. Section
421 provides special advantages to beneficiaries of Form 1-130 petitions
that were revoked or terminated either before or after its approval because
the petitioner died as a result of the September 11, 200 1, terrorist attacks on
the United States. 350 The beneficiaries of § 421 are classified as "special
immigrants," not as "immediate relatives." 35 1 Thus, the logic underlying
these statutory provisions, according to the government, is that there would
have been no need for Congress to enact this statute if the Form 1-130
petitioner's death did not "terminate[] (or otherwise render[] null)," the
352
Form 1-130 petition.
The plaintiffs do not agree that legislation regarding deaths in the context
of 9/11 or the military in any way demonstrates "that it is Congress'[s]
intent to strip immediate relative status from an applicant who has complied
353
with all the statutory prerequisites for lawful permanent residence."
Furthermore, these statutes were legislated after the enactment of the [NA
and are completely independent of it. 354 The acts cited by the government

merely generate a separate right for immediate relatives to self-petition
under the second sentence of § 1151; they do not reference the immediate
355
relative definition in the first sentence.
356
No court decisions analyze either of these two statutes.
345. Robinson, Government's Brief in Support of MTD, supra note 285, at 9.
346. Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1703, 117 Stat. 1392, 1693-96 (2003).
347. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§
421, 423, 115 Stat. 272, 356-63.
348. Robinson, Government's Brief in Support of MTD, supra note 285, at 9.
349. 115 Stat. at 356-57.
350. See §§ 421(a), 421(b)(l)(B)(i), 428(b), 115 Stat. at 356-57.
351. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 28.
352. Lockhart, Government's Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 30; Robinson,
Government's Reply Brief in Further Support of MTD, supra note 197, at 4 (citing § 421
(b)(1)(13)(1)).

353. Taing, Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 193, at 21.

354. Lockhart, Plaintiff's Final Brief, supra note 192, at 23; Taing, Plaintiffs Brief,
supra note 193, at 22.
355. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 23-24; Taing, Plaintiffs Brief,
supra note 193, at 23.
356. The court in Robinson does mention these statutes in a footnote. Robinson v.
Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *17-18 n.7 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009).
However, there is no statement of how either impacted the court's analysis.
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C. Step Two: Ambiguity Granted,Reasonableness Uncertain
Throughout the relevant cases, the government has consistently argued
that, even if the Court considers the language of the statute ambiguous
because congressional intent is unclear, the decisions to deny the
petitioners' 1-130 applications were based on a permissible interpretation of
8 U.S.C. § 1151 and therefore should be entitled to deference under
Chevron.35 7 This section explores the arguments surrounding Chevron Step
Two: whether USCIS's statutory interpretation is reasonable. This step
involves an investigation into two separate realms: first, the acceptable
definitions of "spouse" in other legal contexts and, second, the policy
considerations that underlie the relevant immigration issue in dispute.
1. What Does the Word "Spouse" Really Mean?
The plaintiffs have pointed out numerous times throughout their case
briefs that the word "spouse" is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), but
that the term "marriage" appears nowhere in it. 358 Their argument
continues that, over the past fifty years, spouse has been a common term of
ordinary usage and includes a spouse who outlives the other spouse. 359 The
government, on the other hand, disputes this claimed meaning and believes
that, quite simply, a spouse is a married person. 360 Accordingly, both
terms, marriage and spouse, are "inextricably intertwined and cannot be
separated."'36 1 Thus, the plaintiffs and the government have both attempted
to establish that the definition of the term "spouse" supports their
interpretation, for a determination of the common ordinary meaning of the
word could lend support to either side as to whether the Agency's
interpretation is "reasonable." To ascertain the meaning of "spouse", the
parties have looked to three different sources: (1) Black's Law Dictionary;
(2) the U.S. Code; and (3) various state marriage laws. The reasonableness
of each is discussed in this section.
a. Black's Law Dictionary
Most of the contention regarding the common meaning of "spouse"
involves its definition in various editions of Black's Law Dictionary. The
plaintiffs point to the eighth edition of Black's published in 2004, for the
One's husband or wife by lawful
following definition: 362 "Spouse.
marriage; a married person.... Surviving spouse. A spouse who outlives

357. See Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182-83 (D. Mass. 2007).
358. Taing, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 193, at 14-15.
359. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 16; Taing, Plaintiffs Brief,
supra note 193, at 15.
360. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief in Further Support of MTD, supra note 197, at

2.
361. Id. at 3.
362. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 25.
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the other spouse." 363 Thus, the plaintiffs assert that the definition of spouse
includes the term "surviving spouse." A similar definition of spouse is
found in the sixth edition, published in 1990, which was available at the
time of the enactment of the 1990 INA amendments. 364 Again, the term
"surviving spouse" was expressly incorporated into the definition. 36 5
Moreover, this definition of spouse also implies that spousal status
continues notwithstanding the death of one member because of the
366
language in the surviving spouse definition: "is one of a married pair."
The plaintiffs have also discussed that the current definition of
"immediate relative" has not changed since the time of the original INA
1952 enactment. 36 7 At that time, the Black's Law Dictionaryavailable was
the fourth edition, published in 1951 .368 The definition of spouse in that
edition is broadly stated as "one's wife or husband," but this phrase was
derived from Rosell v. State IndustrialAccident Commission.369 This case,
in turn, defined a surviving spouse as "the one, of a married pair, who
outlives the other. '370 Overall, the plaintiffs have utilized the various
editions of Black's to conclude that "surviving spouse" falls within the
371
broader definition of spouse.
The government, on the other hand, has urged the courts that "[t]he
Secretary's reading of the INA is consistent with the common, ordinary
meaning of the term "'spouse.' ' 372 "Unless Congress clearly intended a
specific, technical meaning, a statute is to be interpreted according to the
common, ordinary meaning of the words of the statute at the time of
enactment." 373 Therefore, the government claims that "[t]he common,
ordinary meaning of the term 'spouse' is a married person. '374 The
government has maintained that the general rule in the United States is that
marriage legally ends when one spouse dies. 375 As for the definitions in
Black's Law Dictionary provided by the plaintiffs, the government has
insisted that "[a]s a matter of simple logic and grammar . . . these

definitions do not support [plaintiffs] position but, rather, support
respondents' arguments." 376 The government has asserted that the
363. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1438-39 (8th ed. 2004).
364. Spouse is defined as "[o]ne's husband or wife, and 'surviving spouse' is one of a
married pair who outlives the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (6th ed. 1990).
365. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 26.
366. Lockhart, Plaintiffs Final Brief, supra note 192, at 17.
367. Taing, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 193, at 15-16.
368. Robinson, Plaintiff s Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 26.
369. 95 P.2d 726, 729 (Or. 1939) (internal quotation marks omitted).
370. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 26 (quoting
Rosell, 95 P.2d at 729).
371. Id. at 26-27.
372. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 12.
373. Id. (citing BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004); Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975)).
374. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1438-39 (8th ed. 2004)).
375. Id. at 13 (citing 52 AM. JUR. 2d Marriage § 8 (2000)).
376. Robinson, Government's Reply Brief in Further Support of MTD, supra note 197, at
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definition of "surviving spouse" is merely provided in conjunction with the
377
definition of spouse, as opposed to being incorporated within it.
Moreover, Black's Law Dictionarydefines "husband" as "[a] married man;
a man who has a lawful wife living" and defines "wife" as "[a] married
woman; a woman who has a lawful husband living." 378 "Spouses" are
"composed exclusively of husbands and wives." 379 Furthermore, according
to the government's briefs, if the plaintiffs argument was accepted, there
would be no need for the concept of "widow" or "widower. '380 Instead, a
spouse transforms
into a widow or widower the instant that his or her
3 81
spouse dies.
b. Husband and Wife: The Defense of MarriageAct
The government has also pointed out that federal law implements the
same fundamental definition of "spouse" in a variety of other contexts for
382
purposes of the administration of every federal statute and regulation.
Thus, the government has argued that within I U.S.C. § 7,383 a person is
only a "spouse" if he or she is either384the husband or the wife in a legal
marriage while both spouses are alive.
The plaintiffs have responded to this contention, first, by stressing that
because a surviving spouse is the one, of a married pair, who outlives the
other, a surviving spouse is still a spouse within 1 U.S.C. § 7.385 Second,
they point to the historical development of 1 U.S.C. § 7. The definition
386
found in the statute originated in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
It is apparent from the legislative history that Congress enacted DOMA to
preserve the institution of marriage as a legal union between one man and
one woman and thus to prevent federal recognition of homosexual
relationships as marriage. 38 7 However, DOMA "was not intended to alter

377.
378.
379.
380.

Id.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 758, 1628 (8th ed. 2004).
Robinson, Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 7.
Robinson, Government's Reply Brief in Further Support of MTD, supra note 197, at

3.
381. Id.
382. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 199, at 12.
383. 1 U.S.C. § 7 provides,
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
I U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
384. Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2007).
385. Taing, Plaintiff's Opposition to MTD, supra note 192, at 18.
386. Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7); see also Robinson,
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 27.
387. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80 at 27-28; see, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 (stating one of
two primary purposes as "defend[ing] the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage").
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[the] traditional understanding of the term spouse. ' 388 The government's
response has been that the definition in I U.S.C. § 7 is expressed in the
present tense, and therefore requires that someone "is," not "was," a
389
husband or a wife.
c. State MarriageLaws
The last main sources of authority for the government's interpretation of
the common meaning of "spouse" are the state laws defining marriage in
the state where the petitioner lives. In three cases, Robinson, Taing, and
Lockhart, the government has pointed to domestic relations law in New
Jersey, 390 Massachusetts, 39 1 and Ohio, 392 respectively. In one of the
government's briefs, it points to a number of New Jersey statutes to support
the notion that a marriage terminates when one spouse dies. 393 For
example, it discusses a New Jersey law that provides that if a person
believes that a prior spouse is dead, that is a viable defense if he or she is
prosecuted for bigamy. 394 Another example is that if a person has been
married more than once, then New Jersey law will presume the latest
marriage to be the valid marriage, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence that the "prior marriage was not terminated by death or
divorce." 39 5 Similarly, in Taing and Lockhart, the government's briefs
pointed to a number of marital laws in Massachusetts and Ohio to
demonstrate the application of the general rule that a marriage ends upon
the death of one spouse. 396 These statutes, such as those involving
prosecution for polygamy, are virtually identical to the ones used by the
397
government in Robinson.
In response to the utilization of these domestic regulations, the plaintiffs
have claimed that state laws defining marriage are irrelevant and
inapplicable. The statutes and corresponding cases "relate to a marriage
terminated by death, not the status of a surviving spouse." 398 Furthermore,
the term at issue is spouse, not marriage, and the plaintiffs have contested
any reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) that implies "marriage" in the
meaning of the statute. 399 Finally, the plaintiffs have emphasized that the
388. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 27.
389. Taing, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 184.

390. See Robinson, Government's Amended Brief, supra note 248, at 13-14; Robinson,
Government's Brief in Support of MTD, supra note 285, at 6-7.
391. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 13-14.
392. Lockhart, Government's Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 15-16.
393. Robinson, Government's Brief in Support of MTD, supra note 285, at 6.
394. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:24-1 (West 2005)).
395. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1035 (N.J.

1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
396. Taing,

Government's Opening

Brief, supra note

198,

at

13-14;

Lockhart,

397. Taing, Government's Opening Brief, supra note 198, at 13-14;
Government's Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 15-16.
398. Robinson, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to MTD, supra note 80, at 29.
399. Id.

Lockhart,

Government's Final Opening Brief, supra note 191, at 15-16.
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traditional definition of spouse for federal purposes "supersedes state
law." 40 0 But, according to the government, when immigration cases raise
marital issues, those issues are always governed by40 the
law of the
1
jurisdiction in which the alleged marriage was performed.
2. The Step Two Conflict: Where the Courts Stand
There are two decisions that discuss the common meaning of the term
"spouse"-one on each side of the circuit split. The Taing court recognized
the validity of the government's argument that the eighth edition of Black's
Law Dictionarydefined "spouse" as "one's husband or wife. ' 40 2 However,
the court criticized the government for omitting the last part of the
definition, "which states that a 'surviving spouse is a spouse who outlives
the other."' 40 3 Additionally, the court discussed the argument under I
U.S.C. § 7 and found that a statute that mandates that a spouse be of the
opposite sex does not mandate that spouses lose their status as such when
one of the pair dies. 40 4 The government's forced interpretation of the
present tense in the statute was rejected, and the court emphasized that the
40 5
entire thrust of the statute was to ensure heterosexual marital unions.
The Robinson court also conducted a thorough analysis of the ordinary
meaning of the term "spouse," but reached a result contradictory to that in
Taing. The Third Circuit initially recognized that the INA itself did not
provide a "helpful definition" of the term,4 06 and thus went on to address
the arguments utilizing Black's Law Dictionary. In doing so, the court
found that "[t]he fact that Black's Law Dictionary'sentry for spouse defines
'surviving spouse' separately disproves Robinson's hypothesis" that she
remained a spouse even after her husband's death. 40 7 Furthermore, the
court deemed it "illogical" to conclude that the terms "spouse" and
"surviving spouse" have an identical meaning, basing its decision on the
legal standard that death terminates a marital union. 40 8 Lastly, the court
went on to address domestic relations law of New Jersey (Mrs. Robinson's
home state) and found that it also supported the notion that "a marriage
40 9
terminates upon the death of one spouse."

400. Id.
401. The "law of the place of marriage governs the validity of a marriage." Robinson,
Government's Reply Brief, supra note 249, at 7 (citing In re H-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 641
(BIA 1962)).
402. Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2007).
403. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (8th ed. 2004)).
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *18 (3d Cir.

Feb. 2, 2009).
407. Id. at*21.
408. Id. (citing 52 Am. JUR. 2d Marriage § 8 (2000)).
409. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1(a)(1) (West 2005)).
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D. Policy Implications

Part II.D discusses the policy considerations involved in this conflict.
Although this Note focuses on a narrow statutory construction issue, it is
worth noting that there are broader policy implications at stake discussed by
both sides of the conflict. The policy arguments utilized by both sides may
also contribute to the "reasonableness" of their statutory interpretation,
discussed above. Part II.D.1 discusses the policy choices underlying the
immigration regime as a whole. Part II.D.2 briefly mentions other policy
considerations, such as the immense number of applications before USCIS
and the speed of adjudication. Finally, Part II.D.3 explains the various
legislative initiatives that have been considered or passed in connection
with this issue.
1. Policy Choices Underlying Statutory and Regulatory Structure
"The overall purpose of the 'immediate relative' provisions is to promote
the goal of family unity on behalf of the [U.S. citizen]...,,410 However, the
government has urged that once the citizen dies, this purpose can no longer
be achieved.4 11 The exception in the second sentence of the statute
extending the ability to remain in the United States to only some surviving
spouses is legitimate, because it "recogniz[es] ties between an alien and the
4 12
country of the alien's deceased spouse."
The plaintiffs have criticized the Agency's position as being both
"[a]rbitrary and [c]apricious." 4 13 They view the purported government
justification, that family unity can no longer be achieved, as "baseless"
because the existence of citizen children and other family ties defeats this
assertion. 4 14 Their opinion is that USCIS's policy yields "tragic and absurd
results that Congress could not have intended. ' '4 15 Under the government's
reading, the pace of adjudication, rather than a petitioner's conscious
decision to promptly file an 1-130 petition, would be the basis for USCIS's
determination. The plaintiffs have attempted to illustrate the irrationality of
the government's position with the following example: a spouse, whose
husband punctually files an 1-130 petition but dies twenty-three months
after the marriage, is in a much worse position than a spouse whose
husband never filed a petition but dies twenty-four months after the
marriage. 4 16 These "anomalous results ...could not have been intended by
4 17
Congress."

410. Robinson, Government's Amended Brief, supra note 248, at 15.

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id. at 15-16.
Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 15-16.
Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 30.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at31.
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In Freeman, the court agreed that the government's contention that
spousal status is stripped by the husband's untimely death is "'contrary to
congressional intent and frustrate[s] congressional policy."'' 4 18 However, in
Robinson, the court noted that Congress has imposed durational
requirements for marriage in a variety of contexts, and thus its ruling was in
harmony with congressional intent. 4 19 The Robinson court then went on to
assert that its holding was "consistent with the core purpose of the U.S.
family-based immigration policy: the promotion of family unification for
U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. '4 20 Congress, according to
the court, in imposing a two-year marriage requirement, "created a balance
between the goal of family unity and the legitimate expectations of an alienspouse whose connections to the United States were likely to have become
solidified during the two-year marriage period." However, the court was
aware that this durational trigger was not met because of a tragic accident
that neither spouse could avoid or anticipate. 4 21 Moreover, although the
court inferred that congressional intent was based upon the fact that a
marriage lasting two years "can be presumed to have been bona fide, ' '422 at
no point is the legitimacy of the Robinson's marriage questioned.
2. Other Relevant Policy Considerations
Two-thirds of legal permanent residents come to the United States on the
basis of a family relationship, with the largest subcategory being spouses of
U.S. citizens. 423 In fact, spouses of U.S. citizens comprised approximately
twenty-five percent of all legally admitted immigrants to the United States
each year during the last quarter of the twentieth century. 424 Thus, there are
an immense number of pending applications before USCIS at any given
time. 425 The issue of the widow penalty is further complicated by the slowmoving nature of the entire system; USCIS can take several years to review
pending applications. 42 6 The court in Freeman noted that,
It is understandable that the immigration authorities may require a
considerable amount of time to process the many applications that come
418. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Akhtar v.
Burzynski, 384 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2004)).
419. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *22-23 (3d
Cir. Feb. 2, 2009).
420. Id. at *23.
421. Id.
422. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
423. Ian de Silva, How to Raise $100 Million for Immigration Enforcement, HUMAN
EVENTS ONLINE, June 9, 2006, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=15460.
424. Calvo, supra note 6, at 156 n.7 (citing FRANK BEAN, AMERICA'S NEWCOMERS AND
THE DYNAMICS OF DIVERSITY 197 (2003)).

425. In fiscal year 2008, USCIS completed an unprecedented 1,171,140 naturalization
applications. Fact Sheet, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Makes Major
Strides During 2008 (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/2008
accomFS_3nov08.pdf.
426. See generally Sasser, supra note 51 (discussing the litigation over the "bureaucratic
nightmare" of delayed adjustment of status applications).
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before them; however, an alien's status as a qualified spouse should not
turn on whether DHS happens to reach a pending application before the
427
citizen spouse happens to die.

According to a complaint in a relevant pending case, USCIS has "created a
system under which combination of spousal death and [USCIS's] inability
to quickly adjudicate petitions severely penalizes grieving widows. '42 8
3. Congressional Initiatives
There are two separate types of legislation (private and public) that can
be enacted to assist those dealing with the widow penalty: one has already
affected a number of women, the other has the potential to affect every
individual facing these circumstances.
a. PrivateLegislation
Currently, there is a possibility for these widow(er)s to become LPRs
through private legislation. 429 A Committee on the Judiciary report
accompanying H.R. 6034430 stated that "one of the two most common
circumstances for granting private bill relief relates to a conditional
permanent resident petition for an alien spouse not being approved before
the untimely death of a U.S. citizen spouse."'43 1 However, there has been a
"precipitous decline" in private laws, despite the relative steadiness in the

427. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Clinton v. New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998)).
428. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandamus
at 7, Robledo v. Chertoff, Civ. No. AW-08-CV-2581 (D. Md., Oct. 2, 2008). For certain
plaintiffs,
[t]hese actions have exacted grief, suffering, loss of work authorization, loss of
travel authorization, separation of family members, and other injuries flowing from
forced unlawful status such as loss of entitlement to estate benefits, social security
benefits, loss of driving privileges due to state laws requiring proof of legal status,
and loss of accrued lawful residence time that is a prerequisite for eventual U.S.
citizenship.
Id. at 8.
429. One example of such private law relief is the case of Anisha Goveas Foti. She was
married to a U.S. citizen, Seth Foti, who died in an airplane crash while performing official
duties for the U.S. government on August 23, 2000. The bill was introduced by
Representative Tom Lantos, a Democrat from California, on June 19, 2001. President
George W. Bush signed the private legislation in 2002, which resulted in Foti becoming a
legal resident in 2002. H.R. 2245, 107th Cong. (2002). "The House Report noted that, 'By
all accounts this was a legitimate marriage, and it is through no fault of her own that Mrs.
Foti has not met the marriage requirements of the I.N.A. This case mirrors several other
private laws enacted in the last few years."' MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., PRIVATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 27 (2005), available at http://www.ilw.com/
immigdaily/news/2005,0819-crs.pdf.
430. See infra notes 434-36 and accompanying text.
431. H.R. REP. No. 110-911, at 2 (2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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number of submissions. 432 One commentator has suggested that private
bills may be dying and will "soon find a place atop the dustbin of
433
congressional history."
b. Public Legislation
Legislation has also been proposed that would give USCIS adjudicators
the discretion to grant LPR status to surviving spouses of deceased U.S.
citizens or naturalized citizens. Both of the following pieces of legislation
were considered in the 10th Congress and could conceivably be
reintroduced this session.
i. Widow Penalty ("McGovern-Udall") Bill
On May 13, 2008, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives
to "amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for relief to
surviving spouses and children." 434 The bill was sponsored by James P.
McGovern (a Democrat from Massachusetts) and Mark Udall (a Democrat
from Colorado). They "believe that case-by-case consideration of these
survivor's cases, and not an automatic denial, would serve the interests
of... the American people." 435 The bill would amend the second sentence
of 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) by inserting "(or if, married for less than two
years at the time of the citizen's death, an alien who proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the marriage was entered into in good
faith and not solely for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit)"
4 36
after the phrase "for at least two years at the time of the citizen's death."
The bill was approved by the House Immigration Subcommittee on July
10, 2008, and was approved by the full House Judiciary Committee on July
16, 2008. On July 30, 2008, Senator Bill Nelson (a Democrat from Florida)
introduced Senate Bill 3369, a companion bill to House Bill 6034.437 The
House Judiciary Committee reported the Widow Penalty Bill to the full
House of Representatives on October 3, 2008.

432. Matthew Mantel, Private Bills and Private Laws, 99 LAw LIBR. J. 87, 90 (2007).

Matthew Mantel lists the following number of private bills enacted since the 96th Congress
(1979-1980) in support of his position: 96th Congress, 122 private bills; 97th Congress, 56
private bills; 98th Congress, 54 private bills; 99th Congress, 24 private bills; 100th Congress,
48 private bills; 101st Congress, 16 private bills; 102nd Congress, 20 private bills; 103rd
Congress, 8 private bills; 104th Congress, 4 private bills; 105th Congress, 10 private bills;
106th Congress, 24 private bills; 107th Congress, 6 private bills; and 108th Congress, 6
private bills. Id. at 90 n.24.
433. Id. at 100.
434. H.R. 6034, 110th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2008).
435. Letter from James P. McGovern & Mark Udall, U.S. House Representatives, to
Congressional Colleagues (June 10, 2008) (on file with author).
436. H.R. 6034.
437. S. 3369, 110th Cong. (2008) (sent to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary July 30, 2008).
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ii. The Reuniting Families Act of 2008
On September 18, 2008, Senator Robert Menendez (a Democrat from
New Jersey) and Congressman Mike Honda (a Democrat from California)
introduced the Reuniting Families Act of 2008. Similar to the proposed
Widow Penalty Bill, a portion of the Reuniting Families Act of 2008 would
define spouse as,
An alien who was the spouse of a citizen of the United States or lawful
permanent resident for not less than 2 years at the time of the citizen's or
resident's death or, if married for less than 2 years at the time of the
citizen's or resident's death, proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the marriage was entered into in good faith and not solely for the
purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit and was not legally separated
from the citizen or resident at the time of the citizen's or resident's
death.., shall be considered, for purposes of this subsection, an
immediate relative after the date of the citizen's or resident's death if the
spouse files a petition under section 204(a)(1)(A)(ii) before the earlier
of(I) 2 years after such date; or
438
(II) the date on which the spouse remarries.
The 110th Congress ended without passing either bill, thus making them
technically "dead." Since the Senate and House of Representatives have
convened from recess on November 17, 2008, and January 6, 2009,
respectively, no further action has been taken on either bill. Both bills,
however, may be resubmitted in the new Congress.

ILL. REFORMING USCIS'S POLICY: HOPE IN THE FACE OF INDIFFERENCE
Parts I and II of this Note described the conflict between a government
agency and a number of federal courts over the definition of one term
within a single statutory section of the INA. The resolution of this dispute
necessarily involves the intricate dissection of the words contained in the
statute, as well as an investigation into the broader immigration regulatory
scheme. Part III begins by evaluating the various arguments regarding the
three main issues explored in Part II: Chevron Steps Zero, One, and Two.
It then concludes that the disagreement surrounding the correct
interpretation of "spouse" in 8 U.S.C. § 1151 must be resolved against
USCIS and in favor of federal courts like that of the Ninth Circuit-that a
surviving spouse is included under a general definition of spousal status and
hence is eligible for immediate relative classification.
The legal implications are thus clear: an administrative agency should
not be permitted to rely on their extrajurisdictional and discredited decision
and then claim it deserves Chevron deference. Additionally, an agency
should not be permitted to enact a policy that is either in opposition to clear

438. Reuniting Families Act, S. 3514, 1 10th Cong. § 3(a) (2008).
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congressional intent, flatly unreasonable, or both. This part argues that for
these reasons, and the Agency's consequent failure to pass Chevron Steps
Zero, One and Two, the Ninth Circuit's reading of the statute is the only
permissible interpretation. Beyond the legal implications, Part III explores
the plethora of policy considerations that are at stake in the resolution of
this issue.
A. Deference Defeated
1. The Failure of Step Zero: Chevron Is Inapplicable
The threshold issue discussed in Part II is Chevron Step Zero: whether
the Agency's position established in In re Varela qualifies for Chevron
deference. 439 If Chevron provides the governing framework, then a
reviewing court would proceed with an inquiry into the two prongs of
Chevron to determine if deference is owed to the Agency's
determination. 440 For a number of reasons, the answer to this preliminary
question is that the Chevron framework should not be applicable to the
Agency's interpretation in Varela.
The government has consistently relied upon Varela as the precedential
administrative decision embodying its policy. 44 1 It is forced to rely upon
this case despite its troublesome aspects, because no other BIA decision
addresses the relevant issue. 442 However, the argument made by the
plaintiffs that Sano severely undercuts any precedential authority Varela
may have is both persuasive and meritorious. 443 Whether a reviewing court
would follow an ad hoc multifactor approach to Chevron's Step Zero
inquiry, 444 or adhere to some established bright-line rules, 44 5 it is unlikely
that Chevron provides the appropriate governing framework.
As an initial matter, the Step Zero analysis would be uncomplicated if
one were to disregard Sano. It is undisputable that BIA decisions are
formal adjudications that normally warrant Chevron deference. 446 After all,
an agency will be assumed to have the power to act with the force of law if
it is authorized to engage in formal procedures. 447 There is little doubt that
Congress delegated to USCIS the responsibility to administer the relevant
statutory program and that 8the BIA considers pertinent terms through its
case-by-case adjudication. 44
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Barnhart,see supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.

445. See the discussion of Christensen v. Harris County and Mead, supra notes 112-16

and accompanying text.
446. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
447. See supra note 116.
448. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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Discounting Sano, the only argument made by the plaintiffs that has
some validity is the lack of analysis in the Varela decision. 44 9 A relevant
consideration in a Step Zero inquiry, according to Justice Stephen Breyer's
approach in Barnhart,is the careful consideration the agency has given the
question over a long period of time. 450 A lack of analysis in the BIA's
opinion could conceivably raise an issue as to whether careful deliberation
was given. However, this argument is considerably weak. Although the
Varela opinion is fairly short in length and does not provide an in-depth
analysis of the relevant considerations, this does not necessarily preclude
thorough contemplation of the issue. Even if this point could possibly be
validated, it is only one factor out of many to resolve the Step Zero inquiry
and thus would not be dispositive.
The plaintiffs' strongest and most compelling argument against the
validity of Varela as a viable precedent is the decision in Sano. The BIA
modified Varela in such a critical respect in Sano that the former can hardly
be considered "good law. '45 1 The significant and complicating impact the
Sano decision had upon the simple bright-line rule regarding BIA
adjudicatory decisions was the essential elimination of Chevron
applicability.
Under Mead, agency decisions will receive Chevron
deference if they are a product of delegated authority to act with the force of
law. 4 52 As Professor Sunstein explains, the most plausible interpretation of
this phrase "force of law" is when an agency decision is binding on private
parties or even if the agency is legally bound by it. 453 Although the
decision in Varela was binding on the private parties in that case, Sano later
made clear that the decision should not have been handed down in the first
place. Sano declared that the BIA itself, due to regulatory constraints, did
not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the beneficiary of an 1-130
petition; the BIA only had jurisdiction to decide a case brought directly by
4 54
an 1-130 petitioner.
The fact that Congress did not explicitly provide the BIA with
jurisdiction to decide these cases is imperative. If the whole premise of
Chevron rests upon a legal fiction of congressional intent, then it would be
illogical to say that Congress intended to delegate authority to an agency to
decide the meaning of a statutory term in the context of a situation that it
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Although there may have been
congressional authorization generally "to engage in the process of
rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed, '4 55 there was no specific congressional authorization
for the BIA to adjudicate in the case of a rejected 1-130 petition brought by
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Sunstein, supra note 87, at 222.
See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
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a beneficiary. The defendants have argued that Varela did not change
earlier Agency practice, 45 6 but that assertion is irrelevant. Even if one were
to decide Chevron Step Zero based upon Barnhart's multifactor case-bycase approach, 457 the important question is still Congress's implied
instructions in the particular statutory scheme.
The subsequent regulation emphasized by the government, entitled
Affidavits of Support on Behalf of Immigrants, 4 58 although published after
notice-and-comment, has little to no bearing on the question of Chevron
applicability. This final rule is not dispositive because the Agency's policy
regarding the denial of 1-130 petitions once the citizen petitioner has died
was decided through adjudicatory means, long before the enactment of the
this rule. 459 USCIS relied on Varela and acted pursuant to this
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(a)(i) for thirty-five years before the
regulation was even promulgated. 4 60 Furthermore, USCIS denied most of
the beneficiaries' applications discussed in this Note before the adoption of
the regulation. 46 1 Thus, USCIS cannot claim that its position was based
upon this regulation nor can it claim that it has been acting pursuant to it.
Throughout the cases discussed in this Note, the government has relied
almost exclusively upon Varela as establishing the Agency's position. The
regulation is only discussed in the government's briefs for a single case and
even there it is barely mentioned. 462 This is a clear indication that USCIS's
interpretation is based upon the BIA decision and not the later ratifying
regulation.
Even if USCIS claims that it is currently acting pursuant to this
regulation for the relevant class of future visa petitions, that argument
should be deemed disingenuous. The purpose of the regulation was not to
amend the procedure under which Form 1-130 beneficiaries are processed
when their citizen spouse dies within two years of the marriage. Rather, the
regulation discusses affidavits of support when approval of a Form 1-130 is
revoked or when the petitioner dies after two years of marriage and the
Form 1-130 is converted to a Form 1-360.463 Thus, future 1-130 petitions
would not be processed under the authority of this regulation. The two line
statement in the regulation discussing the authority to approve a visa

456. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 126.
460. See supra note 126.
461. The regulations were promulgated on June 21, 2006. Sanja Burger's applications
were denied in May 1997. Burger v. McElroy, No. 97 Civ. 8775, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4854, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999). Carla Freeman's applications were denied in May
2004. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006). Osserritta Robinson's and
Neang Chea Taing's applications were both denied in October 2005. Robinson v.
Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009)
(Osserritta); Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D. Mass. 2007) (Neang Chea).
462. See supra note 204.
463. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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petition after the petitioner dies 464 seems to be made merely in passing, and
is neither the focus nor the purpose of the regulation.
Overall, Chevron is not the appropriate governing framework and
therefore deference to USCIS's interpretation of the statute is not
warranted.
2. The Failure of Step One: Congressional Intent is Clear
Even if one were to accept that Varela is a viable precedent embodying
USCIS's policy, the language and structure of the statute unequivocally
demonstrate that Congress intended a Form 1-130 beneficiary to be, and to
remain, an immediate relative, regardless of their spouse's death within two
years of the marriage. Thus, even if the Agency's interpretation could pass
muster under Step Zero and necessitate application of the Chevron test, it
will ultimately fail under Step One.
It is clear that the language of § 1151 creates two separate petitioning
rights: one for aliens whose citizen spouse filed the 1-130 petition prior to
his/her death, and one for aliens whose citizen spouse failed to file the 1-130
petition prior to his/her death. 465 The structure of the statute seemingly
creates such a dichotomy. The first sentence is clear and succinct in
defining who qualifies as an immediate relative, and only contains one
obvious qualifier for parents. 466 If Congress intended another qualifier to
exist to attain spousal status, such as a requirement that the marriage have
lasted two years, it would have done so explicitly. 46 7 The widow(er)s in the
cases discussed in Part I all fall under the immediate relative definition in
468
the first sentence of § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i).
The second sentence on the other hand, requiring a two-year minimum
marriage duration for self-petitioning widow(er)s, 469 cannot be found to
qualify the definition of spouse in the first sentence. To do so would be
misguided and illogical, for it would mean that a spouse can only achieve
the status of an immediate relative after two years of marriage. However,
USCIS can and does approve 1-130 petitions prior to this durational trigger.
Rather, the second sentence provides a different right for widow(er)s to
self-petition if their spouse died without filing the necessary forms; this is a
completely separate immigration process from that described in the first
sentence. 470 Only in the case of a self-petitioner, discussed in the second
47 1
sentence of the statute, is a two-year marriage duration required.
The logic behind a durational requirement for self-petitioners is rational
and understandable. In that situation, the petitioning spouse did not make
464. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 228, 243-45 and accompanying text.

467.
468.
469.
470.
471.

See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
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the conscious decision to actively file the appropriate paperwork prior to
his/her death, and therefore it is fair for the INA to impose heightened
application requirements. But, that rationale is nonexistent when the
petitioner has promptly filed the necessary petition. It makes no sense in
that case to require the marriage to have lasted two years simply because of
the petitioner's unfortunate and untimely death.
None of the arguments proffered by the government 4 72 are persuasive
enough to support their position that the two-year marriage requirement
applies to the entirety of the statutory section and not to the second sentence
independently. The government does make a viable point in asserting that
the sentences of the statute should be read together as an unfragmented
whole; 4 73 however, it is doubtful that the phrase "for purposes of this
subsection" 474 would mandate this. A simpler and more convenient reading
of the statute does not necessarily make it the correct and intended reading.
Additionally, the fact that Congress may have followed a hierarchical
scheme in drafting the statute and thereby subdividing it into statutory
sections 475 is irrelevant. The plaintiffs were correct in pointing out the
government's failure to show how the order of sentences would cause them
to be related. 476 As for the claim that if the plaintiffs' interpretation was
correct then the material in the second sentence would fit more logically
into a different portion of the INA, 4 77 that assertion is similarly immaterial.
Statutes cross-reference each other throughout the INA, and related
information is often put into separate statutory sections for differing
reasons. In this case, although it might have been logical to place the twoyear requirement for a self-petitioning spouse in § 1154 where the
procedure is described, it was also logical for this information to be
included in § 1151, the section that discusses aliens that are not subject to
direct numerical limitations. Both immediate relative petitions and selfpetitions fall under this limited category.
The plaintiffs' position is further supported by the adjustment of status
regime and related regulations; both shed light on clear congressional
intent. The government makes much of the present tense in the statute to
justify their position that the facts stated in the deceased petitioners'
petitions "are not true. '4 78

However, based upon a number of various

immigration statutes and regulations, the plaintiffs are exceedingly more
justified in reasoning that eligibility for immediate relative classification is
established at the time of filing, 479 regardless of the present tense in the
statute. The language "at the time of filing" or "at the time the application
is filed" is woven throughout the visa-petition-related federal regulations
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 246-57, 260-63 and accompanying text.
supra note 252 and accompanying text.
supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
supra note 259 and accompanying text.
supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
supra Part II.B.2.a.
supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
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and statutes. 480 Although the government's position that Congress did not
provide for a "once an immediate relative, always an immediate relative"
approach 48 1 is appealing, that is not an accurate description of the situation.
The plaintiffs make a more delineated and specified claim: when one has
properly filed the appropriate petition and application, and at the time of
filing has established the necessary perquisites to become an immediate
relative, that status should not be stripped away because of the petitioner's
death.
The fact that USCIS can no longer perform a complete investigation once
the petitioner dies is, at first glance, also a clever and compelling
argument; 482 identifying and discouraging marriage fraud is a legitimate
goal clearly contemplated by Congress. 483 However, once one learns that
USCIS routinely conducts such investigations and determines the bona
fides of a marriage without interviewing the petitioning party within the
context of beneficiaries that are abroad, 484 this argument becomes rather
futile. It makes little sense to require less of an investigation when the
beneficiary is not even physically located in the United States. USCIS
cannot even defend this by claiming that such approval is a rare occurrence.
In fact, immigration officials always approve these particular 1-130 petitions
based upon documentary evidence without interviewing the petitioning
485
spouse.
The government also has made much of the regulations in the adjustment
of status regime that provide the authority to revoke the approval of an
immigrant visa petition if the petitioner has died.4 86 Although § 1151 does
not expressly authorize the denial of an unapproved visa petition, the
government refuses to recognize a distinction between predeath and
postdeath approval. 48 7 If an approved petition can be revoked for the
petitioner's death, then why can't it be denied for the same reason? This is
a valid inquiry, one that the plaintiffs have had a difficult time answering.
However, the following three points can be made which minimize the
persuasiveness of the government's assertion.
First, § 1155 is irrelevant to these particular cases because the concepts
of revocation and potential humanitarian discretion apply only to approved
petitions. 488 None of the Form 1-130 visa petitions discussed in Part I of
this Note were approved. Thus, there is justification for simply ignoring
this statute as having no relevance to the issue at hand. Additionally, even
if the revocation statute has some significance, it never contemplates that

480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

See supra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.a.
See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
See supra Part lI.B.2.b.

487. See supra Part II.B.2.b.

488. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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4 89
the death of the petitioner automatically revokes an approved petition.
The language only says that the Secretary of Homeland Security may, for
good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval. 490 Lastly, even in the case
of automatic revocation, there is still a chance for humanitarian discretion
that would reinstate immediate relative status. 49 1 No analogous discretion
exists when death occurs preapproval. At a minimum, USCIS could at least
award some discretion when rejecting these 1-130 petitions.
Another way to ascertain congressional intent is to look at legislative
action that has been taken in separate, but related, contexts. While the
government has pointed to the USA PATRIOT Act and the National
Defense Authorization Act to demonstrate that Congress can, and has,
provided clear immigration benefits to surviving spouses, 492 this argument
is unsatisfactory. Just because Congress has granted additional rights to
surviving spouses within the context of military and terrorist activity, this
does not imply a congressional intent to strip immediate relative status from
all other applicants who have filed the necessary petitions and applications.
Instead, it makes logical sense that these statutes are explicitly adding a
separate right for specific classes of surviving spouses to self-petition under
the second sentence of § 1151. Thus, these acts would have no bearing
upon the first sentence of § 1151.
The last potential source of congressional intent is the bills that
progressed through the 110th Congress. 493 Although discussed under Step
Two in Part II, recent legislative initiatives could be indicative of
Congress's past objectives in enacting § 1151. This legislation gained
substantial support in both the House of Representatives and the Senate and
passed through several legislative hurdles. 494 Thus, the possibility of
congressional amendment could easily indicate that the Agency is getting
congressional intent wrong and that the policy underlying Freeman is
supported throughout Congress, the rulemaking authority that issued the
statute in the first place.
However, two other possibilities cannot be ignored and thus negate any
clear finding of congressional intent. First, the possible bills could also be
an acknowledgement by Congress that the statute it wrote means what the
Agency thinks it means, and thus requires amendment. Alternatively, it is
feasible that Congress has simply changed its mind regarding the
appropriate public policy. If either of these two options is plausible, then
the recent bill initiatives cannot be utilized as a definitive measure of
congressional sentiment.

489. See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.

491. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
492. See supra Part II.B.3.
493. See supra Part I1.D.3.b.
494. See supra Part II.D.3.b.
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Additionally, Congress's use of private bills to ameliorate the harsh
outcome on certain sufferers of the widow penalty4 95 could be an indicator

of Congress's view of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). However, as with public
legislation, this proposition is unconvincing. The entire purpose of private
legislation is to mitigate the application of the law to a particular individual,
without changing the law as generally applicable. Therefore, private bills
could also be considered a recognition by Congress that the statute as
written does not provide relief for the rejected 1-130 beneficiaries discussed
in this Note.
Nevertheless, based upon the statute itself, it is difficult to find that
"immediate relative" is an ambiguous term that was left undefined by
Congress. 496 Congress provided an explicit and succinct definition in the
first sentence of § 1151.497
Thus, the statutory text is clear and
unambiguous. The statute directly addresses the issue, and the Agency
would fail under the first prong of Chevron.
3. The Failure of Step Two: An Unreasonable Interpretation
Assuming arguendo that Chevron provides the appropriate governing
framework, and that the statute and accompanying regulations are
ambiguous or silent as to the appropriate definition of spouse to attain
immediate relative status, the government's construction of the statute
should still not be awarded any deference. It is not merely that the
Agency's interpretation is inferior to that of the plaintiffs; rather it is so
illogical and unreasonable that a court should be able to substitute its own
judgment for that of the Agency.
To begin with, the terminological discussion in Part II regarding the
common meaning of the word "spouse" in various contexts 49 8 is
unconvincing on either side of the debate. On one hand, there is merit to
the idea that the term includes a spouse who outlives the other. However,
one cannot easily dismiss that the terms marriage and spouse are
"inextricably intertwined," thus requiring a spouse to be a married
person. 499 When one turns to "spouse" in Black's Law Dictionaryand sees
that the term "surviving spouse" is listed underneath the definition, it is
reasonable to argue either that it expressly incorporates it or expressly
50 0
excludes it.

Furthermore, while the state laws cited by the government that define
marriage in a way that supports their interpretation of the word "spouse" are

495. See supra Part lI.D.3.a.
496. See Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 834 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the

meaning of the word "treatment" in the Act was ambiguous because no definition had been
provided).

497.
498.
499.
500.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
See supra Part II.C. 1.
See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 365, 377 and accompanying text.
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mildly persuasive,5 0' they have no bearing on the INA or the particular
statute at issue. Overall, neither side's arguments regarding the common
definition of spouse are compelling enough to make the government's
interpretation so unreasonable as to fail the second prong of Chevron. This
is true despite the government's ineffective argument that if the plaintiffs'
position was accepted, there would be no need for the concept of "widow"
or "widower." 50 2 Rather, there are two matters worth discussing that
illustrate the unreasonableness of USCIS's construction of the ambiguous
statute.
The first concern is that the interpretation taken by USCIS is not in
accordance with the purpose of the statute. Because the Agency's position
is in conflict and unaligned with the policy judgments underlying INA's
statutory scheme, it seems wholly unsupported and therefore unreasonable.
Congress enacted the 1990 amendments to the INA for the purpose of
deterring fraud by aliens who wed U.S. citizens in sham marriages for the
purpose of acquiring LPR status. 50 3 Thus, although there may be some
justification for USCIS to require generally for marriages to last two years
as proof of their legitimacy, punishing the beneficiary whose spouse died
before this durational mark in no way serves this goal.
The petitioners in these cases filed all the necessary paperwork and an
investigation into the merits of their marriage is still possible, even after the
death of their respective spouses. Allowing the beneficiaries to continue to
qualify as immediate relatives in no way undermines USCIS's purpose of
deterring sham marriages. Rather, in the process of attempting to deter
marriage fraud, USCIS has forsaken the underlying goal of the entire NA,
which is family reunification.5 0 4 Since the widow penalty in no way
satisfies the objective of marriage fraud deterrence, it cannot be viewed as a
reasonable approach. Rather, its effect of punishing widows of legitimate
marriages contravenes the meaning of the statute.
The second matter exemplifying USCIS's failure to pass Step Two is that
it is simply unreasonable to grant immediate relative status to some Form I130 beneficiaries but not to all, when the only difference between the two
groups is the unintended and unfortunate death of the petitioners. It is
irrational to award the benefits of immediate relative status to someone who
was lucky enough to have their petition adjudicated before their husband's
death and/or before the two year durational mark because USCIS happened
to "perform the ministerial act of approving the petition," 50 5 but to refuse
50 6
the award to someone who was not as fortunate.
Additionally, it is completely illogical that an alien whose citizen spouse
filed the necessary paperwork in a prompt manner, but died twenty-three
501. See supra Part II.C.l.c.

502. See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.

504. See supra note 36.
505. Robinson, Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 169, at 31-32 n.4.
506. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
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months into the marriage, would be denied the ability to become an LPR of
the United States; but an alien whose citizen spouse made no effort to
comply with USCIS procedures in a timely manner but died twenty-four
months into the marriage would still attain the ability to become an LPR.
Clearly a temporal line must be drawn somewhere for these purposes, and
this Note does not seek to claim that there should be no qualifications for
immediate relative status. However, if a line is to be drawn it should be
done in a way with some underlying logic, such as corresponding with the
act of marriage.
The court in Freeman could find no "talismanic significance" of drawing
the line at two years, 50 7 and it seems odd that that wives and husbands
would be required to reach this durational trigger in order to qualify as
immediate relatives. It seems impermissible to allow aliens to suffer on the
basis of two things that are completely out of their control: the pace of
adjudication and their spouse's death.
It makes no logical sense to argue that the passage of time and the
promptness of adjudication would determine someone's spousal status for
immigration purposes. Instead, it is exceedingly more logical for Congress
to have intended for the petitioner's conscious and purposeful decision to
promptly file an 1-130 petition to be the proper basis for the determination.
Overall, even if the statute is ambiguous, and assuming that the common
meaning of the term "spouse" is similarly unclear, the result urged by the
government is manifestly unjust and unreasonable. The government itself
has admitted that extending the ability to remain in the United States to
some surviving spouses is legitimate because it "recogniz[es] ties between
an alien and the country of the alien's deceased spouse." 50 8 That rationale
does not fade away within the context of the widow(er)s discussed in this
Note. Moreover, a connection between an alien and their loved one's home
country is not the only bond that may be present; there may also be the
509
existence of citizen children and other family ties.
The immigration policy of our country should not be to separate these
vital familial links through deportation. Although deportation is not the
subject of this Note, it is the logical end for those individuals faced with the
widow penalty. 510 The surviving spouses whose applications have been
denied, but are physically present in the United States, live in constant fear
of deportation; 5 11 a system that Professor Daniel Kanstroom has called "an
507. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
508. Lockhart, Government's Final Reply Brief, supra note 196, at 15-16.
509. See Harden, supra note 1 ("Many of these widows have infants-U.S. citizens-who
will be de facto deportees when their mothers exhaust their appeals and are ordered out of

the country.").
510. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *35 (3d Cir.

Feb. 2, 2009) (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (stating how Mrs. Robinson will be removed from the
country, because no other relief is available to her other than the extraordinary action of a
private bill).
511. See Harden, supra note 1 ("Legal experts say that... [these] foreign-born surviving
spouses.., are on the brink of deportation.").
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anachronistic embarrassment. ' 5 12 International human rights law has
recognized the importance of family unity 513 and a USCIS policy that
contravenes this objective should not be permitted to exist.
B. The Fix: USCIS Should Reform Its Policy
Since it is apparent that USCIS's interpretation of the statute is not
correct, and this in turn has led to an unreasonable immigration policy, it is
necessary to consider how best to remedy the situation. Even the new
Secretary of DHS, Janet Napolitano, has recognized the need to address the
widow penalty. 514 She posed the question, "What are the regulatory,
legislative, and litigation options that could be considered to immediately
5 15
address the situation of these widows and widowers?"
It seems clear that one possibility is case-by-case adjudication in the
federal courts. If the cases that were decided in the district courts are
appealed up to the federal appellate courts and affirmed there, then USCIS
would be bound to follow those decisions within those circuits. 5 16 This
course of events is especially likely considering that USCIS has not
accepted past verdicts, but rather has appealed virtually every losing case in
the federal courts-what Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland
''5 17
Security, has referred to as "a normal part of responsible lawyering.
Furthermore, if enough courts of appeals rule on this issue, it is plausible
for the Solicitor General to request certiorari from the Supreme Court.
There is a sufficient likelihood of this, considering the recent decision in
Robinson and the subsequent conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. However, the Supreme Court itself has observed that "it
may be impossible to challenge an immigration pattern or practice in the
5 18
context of an individual hearing."
Another available form of action that litigants have used to challenge
government administration of immigration laws is the class action. There is
512. Daniel Kanstroom, Post-DeportationHuman Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or
Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 196 (2007).
513. Id. at 223. "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State." Id. (quoting the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st. plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[D]eportation from a country in
which close family members reside can constitute an interference with family life." Id. at
224 (citing Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. R.9/35, at
134, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981)).
514. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Issues
Immigration and Border Security Action Directive (Jan. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1233353528835.shtm.
515. Id.
516. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
517. CBS News: A Loss of Love and Country Video (CBS television broadcast Nov. 24,
2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4628657n.
518. Jill E. Family, Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'v 71, 75 (2008) (citing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496-97
(1991)).
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currently a pending class action suit regarding this issue in the preliminary
stages;5 19 however this may not be a sensible resolution. Although it
carries the promise of "broad systematic reform," there are threats to the
future of the immigration class action that may imperil this form of
lawsuit. 520 Such threats include "(1) a general congressional willingness to
restrict immigration judicial review; (2) the application of waivers of
judicial review to immigration law; and (3) legislative jurisdiction-stripping
attacks more specific to the immigration class action. '52 1 Considering these
hazards, one should not rely upon the class action as a method to bring
about relief for victims of the widow penalty.
Legislation such as the bills discussed in Part 11522 would also ameliorate
the harsh effects of the widow penalty, however it is an unnecessary
resolution. Since the statute itself is unambiguously written in favor of the
rejected Form 1-130 beneficiaries, the easiest and most efficient solution is a
simple administrative policy change: for USCIS to retract its memorandum
and alter its policy to conform to the decision in Freeman. At this point, the
holding in Freeman applies only to 1-130 petitions filed under similar
circumstances inside of the Ninth Circuit. Thus, USCIS should issue a new
memorandum in which it would mandate that the holding of Freeman
applies in every federal court circuit, thereby eliminating the widow
penalty. There is no need to change the statute itself, for it clearly and
unambiguously supports the beneficiary's right to be and to remain an
immediate relative. The problem is not § 115 1(b)(2)(A)(i); the problem is
the Agency's mistaken interpretation of it.
CONCLUSION

This Note discussed the policy of USCIS to automatically deny a
properly filed immediate relative petition for a beneficiary if their
petitioning American spouse died prior to its adjudication and before the
couple's two-year wedding anniversary. After analyzing all relevant
arguments on both sides of the debate, the ultimate conclusion of this Note
is that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of immediate relative to include a
surviving alien spouse for immigration purposes is both the superior and
only reasonable understanding of the relevant statute.
Once a U.S. citizen chooses to legitimately marry a noncitizen, the alien
should have every fair and reasonable opportunity to enter and/or remain in
this country, despite the citizen's untimely and unfortunate death. Duly
filed petitions, regardless of a death through no fault of the beneficiary,
should be given just and adequate consideration. The current procedure
established by USCIS has created a "regulatory crevice" into which these

519. Hootkins v. Chertoff, No. 07-5696 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 30, 2007).
520. Family, supra note 518, at 74.
521. Id.
522. See supra Part II.D.3.b.
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widow and widowers are dropped. 523 However, they should not be
punished merely because their petition is "stuck in the government's
bureaucracy." 524 The only exception to this should be aliens who do enter
into sham marriages for immigration purposes.
The harsh result of the widow penalty is undeniable, and even Carla
Freeman's story does not have a happy ending. As a result of winning her
legal challenge in court, Mrs. Freeman's immigration case was remanded to
the district director of USCIS with the authority to adjudicate her immediate
relative preference petition. 525 But, the power to act does not necessitate an
action, and immigration officials continued to deny Mrs. Freeman's
adjustment of status application. 526 In the end, a three judge panel of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to issue a writ of mandamus, in
effect making her legal challenge fruitless. 527 Today, Mrs. Freeman cannot
return to the United States, even to see her own husband's grave in
528
Clarkston, Washington.
As for Mrs. Robinson, her lawyer Jeffrey Feinbloom plans to petition for
a rehearing en banc, requesting a hearing in front of the entire full circuit 529
of
twenty-one judges (although only fourteen may hear a case en banc).
The entire Third Circuit Court of Appeals would then have the option to
grant or deny that request. 530 If that fails, he says he will turn to the U.S.
Supreme Court.5 3 1 However, she too will ultimately face deportation if her
lawyer is unsuccessful.
Surviving Spouses Against Deportation, a nonprofit organization formed
to end the widow penalty, has summarized the senselessness of USCIS's
policy in the following way: "USCIS nevertheless routinely approves
applications where the marriage is less than two years old, and routinely
approves waivers for those whose applications happened to be adjudicated
prior to the death. Administrative delay and the happenstance of a death are
the reasons USCIS treats these cases differently. '532 Deportation is an
unforgiving and unjust consequence for those aliens that followed necessary
procedures to satisfy a statute, but were confronted by a government
agency's irrational and illogical interpretation of it.

523. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *34-35 (3d
Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
524. Id. at *25.
525. Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006).
526. Freeman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 489 F.3d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2007).

527. Id. at 969.
528. The Florida Masochist, http://thefloridamasochist.blogspot.com/2007/10/carlafreeman-no-justice.html (Oct. 2, 2007, 20:31 EST).

529.
Claims
530.
531.

Press Release, Surviving Spouses Against Deportation, Staten Island Ferry Crash
One More Victim Under the Widow Penalty (Feb. 2, 2009) (on file with author).
Id.
Widow of S.l Ferry Crash Victim Can't Stay in US, WCBSTV.cOM, Feb. 4, 2009,

http://wcbstv.com/politics/widow. immigration.appeals.2.926750.html.
532. Surviving Spouses Against Deportation, Why Are We Deporting Widows of
American Citizens?, availableat http://www.ssad.org/images/SSAD-Flyer.pdf.
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If, as a nation, we wish to promote legal migration into our country, then
our laws and regulations must reflect a sensible and rationale approach to
immigration. An irrational policy tarnishes our international image and, as
a nation built upon a patchwork of immigrants, betrays our past. This
sentiment was best expressed by Judge Richard L. Nygaard, who dissented
in Robinson. He wrote that "it is untoward of this nation of immigrants, we
who have passed through the portals of citizenship, to coldly and
impassively slam the door behind us on innocent aspirants who dream to
533
follow."

533. Robinson v. Napolitano, No. 07-2977, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1946, at *37 (3d Cir.
Feb. 2, 2009).
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